DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Discourse analysis (DA), or discourse studies, is a general term for a number of approaches to analyzing written, spoken, signed language use or any significant semiotic event.
The objects of discourse analysis—discourse, writing, talk, conversation, communicative event, etc.—are variously defined in terms of coherent sequences of sentences, propositions, speech acts or turns-at-talk. Contrary to much of traditional linguistics, discourse analysts not only study language use 'beyond the sentence boundary', but also prefer to analyze 'naturally occurring' language use, and not invented examples. This is known as corpus linguistics; text linguistics is related. The essential difference between discourse analysis and text linguistics is that it aims at revealing socio-psychological characteristics of a person/persons rather than text structure^[1].
Discourse analysis has been taken up in a variety of social science disciplines, including linguistics, sociology, anthropology, social work, cognitive psychology, social psychology, international relations, human geography, communication studies and translation studies, each of which is subject to its own assumptions, dimensions of analysis, and methodologies. Sociologist Harold Garfinkel was another influence on the discipline: see below.

rwanda

RWANDA AT THE END OF
THE TRANSITION: A NECESSARY
POLITICAL LIBERALISATION
13 November 2002
Africa Report N°53
Nairobi/Brussels, 13 November 2002
This English translation of the French original was published on 4 December 2002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.......................................................................... i
I.
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 4
II. POLITICAL FREEDOMS AND THE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE ............................................................................................. 4
A.
B.
C.
D.
THE RPF’S ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION FROM 1990 TO 1994..................4
THE RPF’S KEY OBJECTIVE: TO CREATE A NEW RWANDAN LEADERSHIP ................................5
MAINTAINING SECURITY PRESSURE AND THE “EXCEPTIONAL” PERIOD ..................................6
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM - CONTINUITY OR A BREAK WITH THE USUAL PRACTICES? ................6
1.
Highly supervised popular participation....................................................................6
2.
Predictable constitutional proposals and legal reforms..........................................7
III. THE AUTHORITARIAN DRIFT OF THE RWANDAN REGIME ...................... 10
A. “CONSENSUAL MODE OF GOVERNING” - RWANDAN-STYLE UNITY .......................................10
      1.
     The façade of pluralism ...........................................................................................10
     2.
    The exile or arrest of opponents ..............................................................................11
B. A DISCIPLINED CIVIL SOCIETY..................................................................................12
C. AN ATROPHIED AND MUZZLED PRESS ....................................................................14
D. THE RISE OF A PARALLEL DISCOURSE ....................................................................16
  1.
 Reinforcement of revisionism and genocide denial .............................................16
2.
The increase of disagreements in the tutsi communities .........................................18
IV. THE STRENGTHENING OF THE OPPOSITION IN EXILE .............................. 19
A. C.
B.
V.
THE ORIGINS OF THE UNARMED EXTERNAL OPPOSITION .................................19
THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE ARMED OPPOSITION...........................................20
ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES.........................................................................................23
1.
The moderate Hutu opposition restructures itself (1998-2002)..................................23
2.
IGIHANGO, A “Pact Sealed in Blood”...................................................................24
   3.
  Political platform .....................................................................................................25
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 26
ANNEXES
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
EXAMPLE OF A REVISIONIST EDITORIAL PUBLISHED BY THE NEWSPAPER LE PARTISAN
(N°50, DECEMBER 2000)....................................................................................................27
LIST OF RPF OPPONENTS WHO HAVE GONE INTO EXILE SINCE 1995.....................................28
THE CASE OF THE PDR UBUYANJA .....................................................................................30
THE FIVE PHASES OF THE RWANDA CONSTITUTIONAL CONSULTATION ...............................32
POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS OF MAIN RWANDAN LEADERS ....................................................34
GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................40
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................42
ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ............................................................................................43
ICG BOARD OF DIRECTORS ................................................................................................48
ICG Africa Report N°53
°
13 November 2002
RWANDA AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION:
A NECESSARY POLITICAL LIBERALISATION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Nine years after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has
reached another crossroads. The transition period
defined by the Arusha Accords will be concluded in
less than a year by a constitutional referendum and
by multi-party elections which should symbolize the
successful democratisation of the country. Today,
however, there are multiple restrictions on political
and civil liberty and no sign of any guarantee, or
even indication, in the outline of the constitutional
plan that the political opposition will be able to
participate in these elections on an equal footing
with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), in power
since 1994.
Control over the activities of political parties was
until now partly justified by the fragile security
situation that Rwanda has experienced since 1994,
during which it has been in a state of almost
permanent war with the Hutu heirs of the
Habyarimana regime on the DRC territory. The
constant political and military support provided to
the Rwandan Hutu militia by the successive Kabila
regimes since 1998, has maintained a continuing
security threat to the country. The restrictions on
political participation can also be explained by the
RPF's distrust of multi-party politics and unrestricted
electoral competition, inspired directly by the
experience of the country’s political disintegration in
the early 1990s leading into the genocide.
Faced with the risk of electoral competition based
exclusively on ethnic lines, the RPF wants first and
foremost to restructure Rwandan political culture
through popular education and the increased
accountability of political leaders. The Rwandan
leadership argues, in effect, that the transformation of
existing states of mind is the prerequisite for the
restoration of full civil and political rights. Thus, for
the past three years, the political parties have either
been dismantled or forced to accept the consensus
imposed by the RPF, the independent press has been
silenced, and civil society forced to exist between
repression and coercion. The RPF wields almost
exclusive military, political and economic control
and tolerates no criticism or challenge to its
authority. The opposition has been forced into exile,
and anti-establishment speeches relegated to secrecy.
In the name of unity and national reconciliation, the
various segments of Rwandan society are subjected
to a paternalistic and authoritarian doctrine and
cannot express themselves freely.
But the RPF should recognise that its authoritarian
actions, whatever their motivation, has worked
against its own stated objectives and is creating its
own opposition. The government's repression of
critical voices creates a vicious circle by radicalizing
the opposition both inside and outside Rwanda. A
blood pact, or "Igihango", has even been sealed
between certain heirs of the "Hutu power" and
survivors of the genocide. This kind of alliance lends
a dangerous legitimacy to an armed Hutu opposition
whose position regarding the genocide remains
ambiguous. Given the unstable regional dynamics,
the rise to power by the opposition forces and the
propagation of genocide denial pose a serious threat
to the stability of the country, particularly at a time
when the Rwandan government is preparing to
liberate tens of thousands of prisoners through
gacaca courts and to repatriate and demobilise a
large part of its army and rebel combatants.
The Rwandan government has honoured its
commitments to the Congolese peace process and has
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
withdrawn its troops from the Kivus. It should now
display the same goodwill for the end of the
transition. The RPF must allow public criticism and
stop being judge and jury, as well as participant, in
the process of political competition. A neutral
institution, such as an ombudsman’s office –
equipped with political, administrative, and financial
independence – must be allowed to establish
equitable standards for political competition and to
define the limits of freedom of expression and
association, in order to avoid abuse bound to lead to
ethnic tensions.
ICG does not argue that all surveillance and all
restraint should be removed from party, media and
civil society activities. The external security
situation, and the fragility of the internal
reconciliation process, make continuing caution
appropriate. But the regulation of political parties
should be seen to be above partisan manipulation,
with standards imposed not by the RPF but a wholly
independent authority. The government must give
Rwandan society the chance to regulate itself, to
assume its own responsibilities towards the genocide
and to create the foundations for general
reconciliation, and not seek to impose every element
of that process. It must not destroy the institutions of
common ground where Hutus and Tutsis can meet,
talk, argue and ultimately agree on the future of the
country. It must reach out to the opposition in exile
and offer it participation in a national debate on the
country's future.
Page ii
2. Encourage the emergence of a responsible and
  independent press by allowing it to regulate its
 activities in the framework of its professional
associations;
3. Liberalise political activities across the entire
  country; and engage in a national debate on
 the rules of integration for all political
constituents in the country in preparation for
the next elections;
4. Allow the return and the participation of
  political parties in exile in time for the next
 elections, on condition that they cut all links
with the armed groups, clearly and
convincingly acknowledge and deplore the
genocide, and commit themselves to a
reconciliation process;
5. Create an ombudsman’s office, directed by a
    committee of “wise men” representing
       different sections of Rwandan society and
      equipped with political, administrative, and
     financial autonomy from any branch of
    government. This office would have the
   responsibility of determining the rules of good
  conduct for politicians, establishing clear
 distinctions between legitimate criticism and
genocide-denying or hatred-inciting behaviour.
The ombudsman could also be mandated to
recommend appropriate measures to deal with
similar concerns arising in the press and civil
society.
To the opposition in exile:
The year to come will be a crucial one for the
credibility of Rwandan constitutional reform,
electoral deadlines and post-transition institutions.
The international community cannot remain silent
accomplices to the authoritarian actions of the
Rwandan government. It cannot finance elections
that offer no political guarantees for a minimum of
equity among the forces present. Today, eight
months before the end of the transition period, the
Rwandan government must bring itself to accept
political liberalisation and reform.
6. Make contact with the International Criminal
  Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and participate
 in the transfer of génocidaires within the
 framework of the Pretoria agreement;
7. Stop immediately armed opposition and
  station, demobilise, and repatriate all its troops;
8. Clarify its own political agenda for the future
  of Rwanda and spell out the programs by
 which it would advance reconciliation;
9. Make clear its acknowledgment and deploring
  of the genocide and its rejection of revisionist
 sentiment;
10. Participate in a national political conference in
   Kigali with the aim of debating the
  constitutional framework of the post-transition
 period, as well as its own participation in
future elections.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
To the Government of Rwanda:
1.
Cease all harassment of civil society and
revise the law on associations to allow them to
operate freely in the entire country without the
constant control of government agents;
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
To the international community and donors to
Rwanda:
Page iii
To the Government of South Africa
16. 11. 12. Refuse to finance the 2003 elections and the
           establishment of post-transitional institutions
          unless they are preceded by the liberalisation
         of political activities and a marked
        improvement in respect for basic freedoms of
       association and expression;
14. Support immediately the creation of a program
   to monitor the electoral campaign and the
  elections themselves.
17. Engage in cooperation with The United
   Nations Observer Mission to the Congo
  (MONUC) in a negotiation with other African
 countries on the resettlement of the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR) combatants who are ready to
lay down their arms but refuse to be
repatriated to Rwanda.
Support the establishment of an ombudsman’s
 office and grant it the means of financial
independence;
13. Convince Rwanda to liberalise its internal
   political environment and to adopt an open-
  door policy towards exiled political parties,
 provided that they reject all links with the
armed groups, contribute to the arrest and
prosecution of known genocidaires at the
ICTR, condemn genocide and clarify their
stand regarding reconciliation in the country.
Demand the unconditional release of Pasteur
Bizimungu, Charles Ntakiruntika, Jean
Mbanda, Pierre Gakwandi and all other
Rwandan political prisoners;
15.
Actively support the peace process in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and
particularly the disarmament, demobilisation,
repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement
(DDRRR) program for the Hutu rebels and
commit to a serious surveillance of the
security situation in Eastern Congo to allow
the government of Rwanda to pursue its
reconciliation and political program in a
peaceful environment.
Nairobi/Brussels, 13 November 2002
ICG Africa Report N°53
°
13 November 2002
RWANDA AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION:
A NECESSARY POLITICAL LIBERALISATION
I.
INTRODUCTION
Rwanda has now reached a critical moment in its
political reconstruction. Eight years after the
genocide, the country is nearing the end of its
transition1. This period will conclude in March 2003
with a constitutional referendum, followed in July by
multi-party elections,
both
legislative
and
presidential, through direct universal suffrage2. Eight
months away from this deadline, the time has now
come for the government to ensure responsible
political competition.
With elections less than a year away, questions of
political freedom, pluralism and multi-party politics
must take centre stage in the debate over the end of
transition. The consideration given to these issues
will greatly affect the democratic credibility of the
June 2003 elections and the post-transition political
system. If the opposition is not given a real voice,
and the chance to campaign and ultimately to act as
a check on the government’s actions within the new
political institutions, then the return to the
1
The Arusha Accords, signed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) and the government of Juvénal Habyarimana on 4
August 1993, set the end of the transition period for the year
2000. Since it won power in July 1994, the RPF government
has persistently seen the accord as a fundamental law, and has
added a ten-point declaration to it. However, the parliament
prolonged the transition period by four years in 1999 in order
to fully implement the programme laid down by the accord,
including, most notably, constitutional reform based on
elections.
2
President Kagame announced that the elections will be
based on universal suffrage at a press conference on 2 July
2002.
democratisation process that was interrupted by the
genocide could end in failure3.
For the moment, there are no political signs that the
July 2003 elections will take place in a context of
genuine pluralism, or even that the main RPF
opponents will be allowed to participate on an equal
footing with the RPF. On the contrary, over the last
three years, police control over all forms of
opposition, both within and outside the regime, has
steadily increased. The press, associations and
opposition parties have been silenced, destroyed or
co-opted. Fearing for their lives, critical politicians,
members of opposition parties, former supporters or
founding members of the RPF have chosen to leave
the country and join other exiled opponents. Some of
these have attempted to set up a diverse coalition
dubbed Igihango, “a pact sealed in blood”, made up
of the heirs of “Hutu Power” and genocide survivors.
This authoritarian drift can be explained by two
factors. Firstly, the RPF’s ideology, which imposes
the boundaries of “political correctness” in modern
Rwanda, is borrowed from a promethean historical
materialism, where the transformation of political
mindsets is a precondition for the exercise of civil
liberties. The Rwandan population will only be able
to exercise its full democratic rights once it has
abandoned the ethnic distinctions that led to the
genocide. At present, the RPF considers that granting
political freedom would risk playing into the hands
of divisionist and pro-genocide forces and undermine
national unity and reconciliation. In addition, the
3
The first Rwandan transition, which began in 1990 with the
arrival of the multi-party system and was marked by the civil
war between the RPF and the regime headed by Juvénal
Habyarimana, ended in rampant political instability, which
encouraged the rise of extremist parties and resulted in the
genocide of April-June 1994.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
RPF is prioritising economic and social rights above
civil and political rights, deeming that the Rwandan
peasantry is still at the mercy of primary material
needs such as food, health and education.
The post-genocide situation is clearly exceptional
and requires its leaders to demonstrate an equally
exceptional sense of responsibility. But this also
runs the risk of arbitrarily imposing a definition of
this responsibility without the right to challenge it.
This explains why, since 1994, the RPF has turned
“consensual” politics into a veritable mode of
governing, and marginalised the importance of
criticism or opposition. In practice, the doctrine and
politics of unity directly contradict the exercise of
political freedom and pluralism. When the regime’s
viewpoint is not respected, accepted or understood,
it is simply imposed. In this context, the political
parties that exist today in Rwanda are only tolerated
if they agree not to question the definition of
political life drawn up by the RPF. Their existence
serves to maintain the facade of compliance with the
Arusha Accords on power sharing, negotiated with
the Habyarimana government in 1993.
Loyal to their years of education in Uganda in the
ideas of Yoweri Museveni4, the leaders in Kigali
prefer a non-partisan political system to a multi-
party system, in which political leaders are judged
on their individual performance and integrity. This
explains the ban imposed on political parties taking
part in the local elections of March 2001, and the
priority given to candidates’ personal qualities in the
partisan electioneering5.
The restrictions on civil and political liberties are
imposed in the name of stability and the duty to
promote unity and reconciliation after the genocide.
Civil society, the media and politicians, whether they
belong to the RPF or another party, are forced to
remain in this political straitjacket. Yet excluding
part of the Rwandan elite from political life has
served to radicalise the opposition in exile. For a
growing number of opponents, armed resistance is
Page 2
seen as an increasingly attractive option, which in
turn fuels security pressures on the regime.
It is clear that over the last eight years, security issues
inherited from the genocide remain a real threat.
When it first came to power, the RPF managed to
establish a fragile control of Rwandan territory by the
end of 1994. Later, it launched the first Congo war
aimed at eliminating once and for all the heirs of
Hutu Power who had taken refuge in the Kivus.
However, at the end of 1997, the insurrection led by
armed Hutu groups in the north-western provinces
proved that the task had not been accomplished. The
task became dangerously more complicated when
Rwanda and its allies started a second war in August
1998 against Laurent Kabila, who responded by
employing the armed Hutu groups as his infantry to
stem the advance of Rwandan troops.
Since then, the Congolese government has constantly
sought to maintain the security threat to Rwanda by
arming the ex-FAR soldiers and Interahamwe and
their new recruits who have been mobilised from the
two Kivus, to contain the RPA’s military advance
and “send the war back to where it came from”.
When Joseph Kabila succeeded his father in January
2001, he even proclaimed himself, through his
minister Mwenze Kongolo, the official sponsor of the
armed opposition, offering a platform and backing to
the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
(FDLR), the latest reincarnation of Hutu Power6.
It is encouraging that FDLR representatives were
expelled from Kinshasa in September 2002 and that
several alleged organisers of the genocide were
finally arrested by the Congolese government and its
allies7. However, the 10-15,000 men8 serving in the
FDLR’s armed wing and stationed in Congo and the
Kivus, still have to be disarmed and demobilised.
Since 1999, the feud between Kigali and Kampala
that resulted in three deadly clashes for control over
the Congolese town of Kisangani and the repeated
attempts at destabilisation on both sides have also
transformed the RPF’s spiritual leader, Yoweri
Museveni, into an alternative sponsor for the
6
4
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement advocated the
politics of “movement” over partisan politics in Uganda,
which contributed to a policy driven by ethnic division under
the regime of Idi Amin and Milton Obote.
5
ICG Africa report N°34, “Consensual Democracy in post-
genocide Rwanda, Evaluating the March 2001 District
Elections”, 9 October 2001.
ICG Africa Report N°38, “Disarmament in the Congo:
Jump-starting DDRRR to Prevent Further War”, 14
December 2001.
7
In August 2002, General Augustin Bizimungu was arrested
in Angola, Jean-Baptiste Gatete in September in Congo-
Brazzaville and Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho was arrested at
the beginning of October in Kinshasa.
8
Estimated figure regrouping all the units from all territories.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Rwandan opposition. Since 1999, Kampala has
become the favourite refuge of deserters from the
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and a mandatory
stop for politicians fleeing Kigali. They are
guaranteed support and reassurance in the home of a
former mentor only too happy to nourish the anxiety
of Rwandan leaders9 over perceived security threats.
Added to this already complex national and regional
context, Rwanda will have to face three other
extremely delicate political processes in the coming
year. These may well provide an armed opposition
with the means to garner support inside the country.
The launch of the gacaca courts will result in the
release of over 80,000 prisoners in the medium
term10, whose poor conditions of detention will have
doubtless generated resentment. Moreover, Rwanda
has just withdrawn at least 23,000 troops from the
Congo, including a significant Hutu contingent. In
the medium term, the Rwandan government must
carry out a massive demobilisation of members of its
army purely for reasons of economic and financial
survival. These men will themselves be easy
pickings for any dissident or opposition movement,
armed or unarmed. Finally, under the terms of the
Pretoria Accord signed on 30 July 2002 with the
DRC government, at least an equal number of Hutu
soldiers from the FDLR are supposed to be
repatriated to Rwanda. This amounts to a veritable
pool of candidates for political mobilisation by the
radical opposition in the hills of Rwanda on the eve
of elections.
For the moment, the FDLR troops have neither been
disarmed nor demobilised. It is likely that the
demobilisation of the RPA will also be delayed as
long as the Hutu rebellion remains active. The
withdrawal from the Congo, without even
speculating over the internal opposition that this is
likely to spark within the government, risks dragging
the conflict that began in 1990 back into the country.
Rwanda’s authoritarianism has created a vicious
circle by radicalising the unarmed opposition which
is being pushed into an alliance with revisionist
extremists. In turn, this exacerbates the existing
security problems and consequently reinforces the
authoritarianism of the regime.
9
Cf. ICG Africa Report N°14, “Rwanda and Uganda:
Friends or Enemies?” 5 May 2000, and ICG Briefing
“Rwanda/Uganda: a Dangerous War of Nerves”, 21
December 2001.
10
Report by Penal Reform International, 2002, Kigali.
Page 3
This report on the political landscape at the end of
transition provides a detailed analysis of this vicious
circle and offers a number of suggestions to
overcome it. The report primarily focuses on the
political process underway but also takes into
account the outcome of efforts for justice,
reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda. It
concludes that it is not too late to reverse the current
authoritarian tendency and build a genuinely
inclusive and lasting political model that has not
existed in Rwanda since independence. Until now,
the process of constitutional reform has provided no
guarantees of political freedom and appears to be
exacerbating the current tensions. However, this
reform, along with the pre-election period of
campaigning and debates, offers an opportunity to
defuse the situation and to lead Rwanda towards an
end of transition that makes a real contribution to the
stabilisation of the country.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
II.
POLITICAL FREEDOMS AND THE
MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
The issue of the liberalisation of political life in
Rwanda must be understood in the context of the
experience of democratisation from 1990-1994,
which took place at exactly the same time as the civil
war between the Habyarimana regime and the RPF.
The RPF justifies its control over political life on its
analysis of this period. It considers that the political
leaders at the time were incapable of maturity and
responsibility. The RPF’s political platform is
informed by the belief that the population must be re-
educated and political leaders must develop a greater
sense of responsibility as a prerequisite for
democratisation. Political liberalisation is thus
contingent on a change of mindset, meaning, in
effect, the achievement of the ideological objectives
laid down by the RPF.
A.
THE RPF’S ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF
DEMOCRATISATION FROM 1990 TO 1994
From 1991 onwards, political liberalisation in
Rwanda enabled opposition parties to emerge,
notably the Republican Democratic Movement
(MDR), the Social Democrat Party (PSD), the
Liberal Party (PL) and the Christian Democrat Party
(PDC). However, behind the democratic discourse
preached by all the parties, strong regional divisions
remained. The MRND (National Revolutionary
Movement for Development) represented the
prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, the fiefdom of
President Habyarimana, and the symbol of Hutu
power in the north. The MDR PARMEHUTU, a
revival of the party led by the first President,
Grégoire Kayibanda, represented the southern
prefectures of Gitarama and Butare and brings
together the pro-south Hutu political class that was
excluded from power in 1973 by the pro-north
regime of President Habyarimana. The PSD also
brings together the excluded southerners, mostly
from Butare. The PL drew Tutsi support and was
rapidly absorbed by an internal wing of the RPF,
Page 4
which launched its first military operations from
Uganda on 1 October 199011.
This era of political liberalisation coincided with a
period of civil war. This resulted, inevitably, in the
gradual polarisation of political lines. The Hutu
extremists, represented by the Coalition for the
Defence of the Republic (CDR, extremist Hutu
party), and the MRND, managed to mobilise the
opposition parties and build an anti-Tutsi bloc to
counter the RPF threat. The MDR split into two
factions: the MDR Power clan symbolised by the
concept of PARMEHUTU, born out of the 1959
“social revolution”12 on the one hand, and an
extremely moderate clan on the other. In the end, the
politics of ethnic division proved more powerful than
the regionalist, democratic stance, and resulted in the
formation of the “Hutu power” bloc that planned the
genocide. For the RPF, it is clear that the multi-party
system was incapable of stemming the extremist tide
that led to the genocide. From then on, the movement
was convinced that the only way to banish ethnic
divisions would be to impose a discourse of unity.
Paul Kagame13 summed up this sentiment in 1995
when he stated: “If you try to organise elections, to
authorise parties to grow like mushrooms and allow
competition, you will be making an even bigger
problem for yourself than the one you already have:
dividing people who are already divided. What does
the multi-party system mean in our African societies?
That I will use every tactic to distinguish myself from
my neighbour with the aim of winning more votes
than he wins. (...) You will never have a united
country. We will never have democracy: people will
pounce on each other. One party would emerge to
defend those who perpetrated the genocide, then
another would arise saying that members of the
former should be tried. (...) You would have a great
11
Political Crises in Burundi and Rwanda (1993-1994),
supervised by André Guichaoua, University of Lille Press,
1995.
12
In 1959, the emerging Hutu elite rebelled against the Tutsi
monarchy and demanded its share of power. This uprising
remained a symbol of social liberation for the Hutu
community but went out of control when independence was
achieved and resulted in the anti-Tutsi pogroms of 1962 and
1963, carried out with the tacit support of Belgium and the
Catholic Church. Cf. Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis,
History of a genocide, Hurst and Company, London, 1995.
13
President of the Rwandan Republic since April 2000, Vice
President from 1994 to 2000. He has been the leader of the
RPF since the start of the civil war in Rwanda in 1990.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
war. We must analyse the problems that are in store
for us and those that we are going to solve14.”
B.
THE RPF’S KEY OBJECTIVE: TO CREATE
A NEW RWANDAN LEADERSHIP
Since 1990, the RPF has advocated the application
of political and economic reforms, under a new
leadership, aimed at creating a “New Rwanda”.
These political reforms are rooted in the concept of a
“participatory approach” in which the population
and the leadership work together to transform the
country. Two main goals are required before
beginning this process: educating the population and
making the elite more responsible. Once this has
been achieved and the effects of bad governance by
previous regimes has disappeared, the Rwandan
people will be emancipated from their current
obscurantism and able to fully exercise their civil
and political liberties. This emancipation should be
based on three principles:
Educating the population15
The decades of authoritarianism, from the long
monarchical tradition through to the one-party
regime led by President Habyarimana, resulted in the
concentration of political and economic power, and
the reinforcement of top-down administrative
control over the population. This control was so tight
that the government was able to manipulate the
population into committing genocide. For the RPF, it
is important to help the population resist such
political manipulation by tackling key issues such as
hunger, illiteracy and obscurantism and by gradually
instilling democratic principles.
Giving leaders a sense of responsibility16
14
François Misser, “Towards a New Rwanda?”, Karthala,
1995. Interview with Vice-President Kagame in 1995.
15
“Democracy must follow a “process”, and help to find
solutions to Rwandans problems.” “To give the floor and
freedom to the people, so that they can talk about their
problems and how they can be solved. A Rwandan citizen has
never been given the floor, he has always been waiting for
instructions from his superiors and he has always been guided
by them. It is necessary, therefore, to look for “mechanisms”
of giving the floor to people”. “There must also be trainings
for the people, in order to raise their awareness of talking
about their problems and looking for solutions to them
(sensitization)”. Cf. “Report on the reflection meetings held in
the office of the President of the Republic”, Kigali, August
1999, p. 46.
Page 5
The RPF does not foresee banning political parties,
but rather obliging them to subscribe to its overall
plan for a new Rwandan society. A strict code of
conduct was designed to govern all political activity.
On a local and national level, the people will monitor
the behaviour of their leaders through the power of
their vote.
Reforming the institutions 17
The first stage in implementing this objective was to
introduce decentralisation18. This involved setting up
local government structures elected by the people,
and close to them. The drafting of a new constitution
should ensure a balance between central and local
government. It should also provide an institutional
framework to consolidate the RPF’s political
platform. The new constitution does not envisage the
immediate arrival of democracy, but proposes a
framework in which this would be achievable. Only
at the end of this process of re-education will the
respect for political liberties be guaranteed. For the
time being, a strong, “enlightened” leadership is
required to maintain the country’s unity.
16
“Because “leaders” have much responsibility for the
people, trainings for those leaders must be prepared (political
schools).” “To examine the existing political parties and the
role they should play”. “It was adopted that democracy
which makes Rwandans really participate in the way they are
governed and in deciding the actions regarding them. Which
was then called “participatory democracy”. To enable the
people to participate and be given the floor, it came the idea
that leaders should be elected, starting from the basic
structures”. Op. cit.
17
“To enable the people to really participate in their way of
being governed, appropriate strategies must be taken: To
bring near the people decision-making institutions in which
they would actively participate. To set up structures (Forum)
in which the people give theirs ideas about how problems
would be solved. Evaluating how leaders are working
(Evaluation). Controlling how leaders are working (Contrôle)
(...). To make Rwandans understand that it is them who are
mainly concerned by problems and their solutions. To make
Rwandans like shared government. Which is not detained by
one individual, because this helps not using force and
injustice and controlling each other in the way of governing
(Equilibre des pouvoirs). To endeavour to train Rwandans
and raise their awareness so that they become more educated.
To prepare a very clear and concise document containing
instructions relating to the leaders good conduct and
behaviour (Code de conduite des leaders’)”. Op. cit., p. 53.
18
ICG Africa Report N°34, “Consensual Democracy in post
Genocide Rwanda, Evaluating the March 2001 District
Elections”, 9 October 2001.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
C.
MAINTAINING SECURITY PRESSURE
THE “EXCEPTIONAL” PERIOD
AND
The eight years of transition from 1994 to 2002 were
marked by a situation of almost permanent war, due
to the ongoing military threat from armed Hutu
groups based in the region and the countries that
backed them. This situation had a negative impact
on the planned process of political reform, and most
of all on political liberties.
Page 6
remain difficult, the rebel groups are not disarmed,
and internal political life does not return to normal,
the civil war begun in 1990 could well be imported
back to Rwanda.
This context of external hostility has prompted the
government to tighten its grip on internal political
life. Its aim is not only to avoid the rise of an
ethnically based political movement inside Rwanda,
but also possible connections between internal
opposition groups and armed external movements.
Yet the current process of constitutional reform,
which must be approved by referendum before the
2003 presidential elections, is a continuation of this
logic and for the moment does not seem to offer the
promise of political liberalisation for the foreseeable
future.
From 1994 to 1996, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe D.
regrouped and infiltrated Rwanda from the refugee
camps in Kivu. At the end of 1996, the RPA decided
to destroy the refugee camps in the Congo in an
operation that resulted in a manhunt throughout
Congo. In May 1997, President Mobutu was
overthrown and Laurent-Désiré Kabila was
  parachuted in as the Congolese head of State by
  Rwandan troops. The first invasion of Congo did
  not, however, put a stop to the threat by the armed
  militia. From 1996-98, a section of the Hutu
  guerrilla unit re-stationed itself in north-western
  Rwanda, as evidenced by the fresh wave of armed
  insurrection in the provinces of Ruhengeri and
  Gisenyi from November 1997 to February 1998.
In August 1998, after a clash with his Rwandan and 1.
Ugandan backers who tried to overthrow him,
Laurent-Désiré Kabila sealed an alliance with the ex-
  FAR and Interahamwe and helped them re-infiltrate
  into Kivu. The north-western rebellion had hardly
  been quelled when the regional war caused the threat
  of these groups in Kivu to resurface. For more than
  four years (until September 2002), Rwanda occupied
  Congo, hoping to keep the war outside its borders
  and provoke a regime change in Kinshasha
  favourable to Rwanda. Meanwhile, the situation in
  Rwanda itself stabilised, the regime reinforced its
  administrative and territorial control over the country
  and there was no infiltration to upset the relative
  peace. The last attempt by armed Hutu groups
  (known as ALiR) to infiltrate Rwanda ended in
  complete failure.
Developments in the peace process in the DRC
could put an end to this situation of externalising the
civil war in Rwanda. The recent announcement of
Rwanda’s withdrawal from Congo and the setting up
of a DDRRR programme (Disarmament,
Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reinstallation and
Reinsertion) for Hutu soldiers are welcome signs,
but could seriously endanger the internal security of
the country. If relations between Rwanda and Congo
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM -
CONTINUITY
OR A BREAK WITH THE USUAL PRACTICES?
The draft constitution is currently being written and
will probably be made public at the end of 2002.
However, its broad outline has already been
announced in proposals made by the Constitutional
Commission, and especially the Presidency. For the
first time in Rwandan history, these proposals are
based on popular consultation in line with the
government’s participatory approach. Nevertheless,
it appears that this consultation process has not
really opened up the debate on the future of Rwanda,
and there has been no challenge to the political
strategy enforced by the regime.
Highly supervised popular participation
The Constitutional Commission, whose creation was
provided for in the 1993 Arusha Agreement, was set
up at the end of 2000 on the basis of law n° 23/99 of
24 December 1999. Its president, Tito Rutaremara,
was appointed on 23 November 2000 by the
National Assembly of Transition (ANT). One of the
RPF’s ideologists, he was previously president of the
Forum of parties and head of the RPF group at the
National Assembly, as well as being the first RPF
deputy in 1993. Twelve other members were elected
by the ANT on 10 July 200019. The composition of
Commission members exactly mirrors the political
make-up of the ANT. The Commission is charged
19
“Progress of Activities at the Legal and Constitutional
Commission,” (CJC) October 2001.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
with drafting the new constitution and has divided its
work into five phases20. The first stage, which is
now complete, was an awareness-raising campaign
and process of popular consultation, held between
January and June 2002. As commissioner Jacques
Kabale pointed out, “the Commission has the merit
of asking the opinions of an uneducated
population”21. The education phase focused on
democratic principles but also on the RPF’s political
doctrine, which it integrated into its training and
awareness-raising module for the population in May
2001. It includes, for example, the official line on
political parties:
Political parties should, in their own way,
rectify or change the bad behaviour attributed
to them by the population; the parties must
disclose their political beliefs and the real
platform that shows how they will contribute
to solving the country’s problems; the parties
must avoid sowing the seeds of divisionism
among Rwandans; the parties must accept that
electoral defeat will not be a source of
insecurity or the destruction of the country;
the behaviour of party leaders should set an
example to their members and all Rwandans.22
From May to August 2002, more than 590 meetings
were held throughout the country, attended by
between 200 and 2000 people. The Commission felt
that the population’s participation was widespread
enough to prove its commitment to the project.
However, the number of people present at the
meetings could be a misleading sign of popular
support. Since the monarchy and during the
succession of republics, the Rwandan peasantry
developed an acquiescent response to statements
made by officials, which are often perceived as
instructions from the State. The proposals made by
the people could be interpreted as an echo of the
discourse that is delivered to them by representatives
of the Commission, and a way of avoiding
confrontation with the government. It is not certain
that the latter, who sees the population as
uneducated and is convinced that they need close
Page 7
supervision, will take the trouble to distinguish
between the peasant population’s game of avoidance
and the genuine expression of their opinions.
There is a risk that the people’s voice will be
appropriated in order to impose principles that have
already been decided on by the regime. By getting
the population to say that “it does not want political
parties,” and that “politics should be done in Kigali
and not among the people”,23 this neutralises any
challenge to the new constitution and defuses all
international criticism. The ideas that are supported at
a grass-roots level will bypass partisan politics, and
above all clearly suggest that any desire for local
mobilisation is illegitimate. It will also allow the
government to build its own political base with no
real competition.
2.
The final draft of the Constitution has not yet been
written but its main ideas are already apparent.
Members of the Commission, after a year of
consultation, have agreed on its broad outline and
the contribution made by the office of the president
completes the overall vision proposed by the
Commission.24
President Kagame took a decisive step in declaring
that the presidential and legislative elections would
be held by direct universal suffrage and secret
ballot25. All his opponents had called for this form of
election, accusing the government of wanting to
impose indirect elections in order to control the
selection of local representatives and be assured of
their support. Soldiers and certain RPF politicians
(including Tito Rutaremara, the president of the
Commission),26 also advocated a mode of indirect
elections, fearing the “Buyoya” syndrome and the
RPF’s inability to find popular support among
Hutus.27 Despite this internal RPF wrangling,
President Kagame went ahead with the challenge of
direct universal suffrage, after receiving backing
23
20
“Action Plan and Budget”, CJC, December 2000, “Progress
of Activities at the Legal and Constitutional Commission,”
CJC, October 2001. Cf. presentation of the five phases in
appendix IV.
21
ICG interview, Mr. Jacques Kabale, commissioner, June
2002.
22
Training and Awareness-Raising Module in constitutional
Matters, May 2001, p. 24.
Predictable constitutional proposals and
legal reforms
ICG interview, Tito Rutaremara, Kabale, June 2002.
Contribution by the presidency to the constitutional
debate, June 2002. Document translated by ICG.
25
Press conference by President Kagame, AFP, 2 July 2002.
26
ICG interview, RPF member, June 2002.
27
The President of Burundi Pierre Buyoya held presidential
elections in 1993, convinced that his democratisation policy
would win him Hutu votes. He lost the elections to the
FRODEBU candidate Melchior Ndadaye.
24
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
from the political wing, notably secretary general
Charles Murigande.
In exchange for this important concession, the rules
governing the exercise of political activities will be
extremely strict. Political speeches by parliamentary
candidates must endorse unity and reconciliation, and
the same rule will doubtless apply to presidential
hopefuls.28 The political arena will be governed by
the law on political parties, the code of conduct for
politicians and the rules of the Forum for political
parties. The proposal submitted by the presidency
contains the implicit condition that parties will only
be allowed to campaign on a grass-roots level if their
politicians demonstrate exemplary behaviour and
present their ideology and platform clearly.29 There
are also indications of the desire to limit campaigning
in the capital or the provinces. The office of the
president has explained that “the setting up of
political structures was delayed by a problem of
political maturity”.30
This institutionalisation in the Constitution of the
rules governing political activities, based on current
practices, poses a problem for the immediate future
of political freedom in Rwanda. It leaves no room for
the gradual liberalisation of politics or for the process
of developing a sense of responsibility, as required
by the government’s political doctrine.
Firstly, the main supervisory body for political
activity, the Forum on political parties, does not
seem to be challenged in the constitutional proposals
that have come to light, or in the legal texts that
accompany the constitution. Yet through the Forum,
the RPF currently controls all political life,
sanctioning any politician who challenges the
government’s line or calls for a new, credible
alternative (see below).31
The Forum has no legal status at present, but the
current draft law intended to institutionalise it after
the transition is a sure sign that the government is
satisfied with its instrument of control. The law
would authorise the Forum to: “take disciplinary
measures against any politician or political party that
does not comply with the rules of the forum, the code
of conduct for political parties and politicians and the
28
Constitutional proposal from members of the presidency.
To be legalised, they must have 100 members for each
province.
30
Constitutional proposal from members of the presidency.
31
ICG interview, Brussels, Kigali, June 2002.
29
Page 8
directives of the forum’s general assembly.”32 The
law on political parties and the code of conduct,
designed to complement the new constitution, could
open the way to all kinds of authoritarian practices.
In May 2001, a select committee from the Forum
presented the office of the president with a draft bill
on the regulation of political parties.33 The bill
proposed to regulate the activities of political parties
according to the degree of security constraints in the
country. During a “normal” period, political leaders
will have to respect a bible establishing the limits of
political correctness and good political behaviour.34
The following examples of the text reveal a
moralising, determinist tendency in defining the
profile of the “new Rwandan leader”:
It is forbidden to have or to display attitudes
that
undermine
credibility
such
as
drunkenness, lies, licentiousness, breach of
trust or betrayal, manipulation, expropriation,
corruption, double talk; a reputation of
divisionism or discrimination must be avoided;
it is forbidden to display obsequiousness; it is
forbidden to plot against others; it is forbidden
to betray one’s country; it is forbidden to work
in secret.
Such a law could be used to justify all kinds of
authoritarian acts, including the following example.
During one of its meetings in mid-October, the
Forum of authorised parties “named and shamed” a
certain Jean Népomuscène Nayinzira. This founding
member and president of the PDC, now the
Democratic Party, had just been ousted by his peers
for unacceptable behaviour (womanising, not
recognising paternity, etc.) On 22 October 2002, the
Forum gave the PDC party two weeks to officially
request Nayinzira’s exclusion from parliament. If the
motion was not filed within the deadline, and the
man was not withdrawn, he would be ousted from
parliament at the Forum’s request. On 26 October
2002, Nayinzira announced he was leaving the PDC,
after being expelled from the assembly, thus putting
an end to his political career. He asked for an enquiry
32
Draft bill on the establishment and functioning of the
Forum of parties.
33
3 May 2001, Bill on the code of conduct of political
parties – a bill on the establishment and functioning of the
Forum of parties.
34
Forum of political parties, “Draft bill on the code of
conduct for political parties” (select committee of May
2001).
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
to be launched and for a court to rule on the truth of
the accusations. One might suspect that such
practices are an indirect way of getting rid of a
potential candidate in the presidential elections.35
The “exceptional” period is defined as follows: a
period of war, unrest, catastrophes, transition,
political instability, or a power void. The constraints
allowed during an exceptional period are so strict that
they completely eliminate any possibility of political
mobilisation or opposition.
During such a situation politicians and
political parties are forbidden to do the
following:
! Take any action, make speeches or produce
 writings that undermine or discourage the
country’s strength.
! Highlight or promote the concerns or interests
 of their camp or party during an exceptional
situation (state of emergency).
! Take advantage of the painful situation of
 victim populations in order to serve the
interests of the camp or the party.
! Disagree with or oppose provisions allowing
 for the appointment or installation of a head of
State.
During the exceptional period, a politician or
political party is required to:
! Make an active contribution to and take
 initiatives in the fight against political
arguments or criticism that may be used by
enemies to attack Rwanda.
! Mobilise the population through speeches,
 actions and writing to help it prepare for war
and carry out acts of sacrifice for the country.
It must be noted that the current transition period is
included in the exceptional period, which is an
admission in itself that for the last eight years the
political arena and civil liberties have been
completely restricted. If this law on political parties
is passed and applied before the presidential
elections, the election campaign of June-July 2003
will be hardly much more than a farce. No candidate
or party will be allowed to emerge as a credible
35
UMUSESO, N 103 28 October-3 November 2002, N 102
21-27 October 2002. AFP Kigali, 26 October 2002.
Page 9
alternative. On the excuse of preventing the rise of
extremist parties, the end of the transition runs the
risk of producing a parody of a democratic electoral
process, in which the RPF will be the only party
allowed to campaign and be elected. If the
international community gives its financial backing
to the elections, it will be an accomplice to the
preservation of the status quo.
In addition to its political management, the Rwandan
government has made efforts towards reconciliation,
including the reintegration of ex-FAR Hutu soldiers
into the army, the work of the unity and
reconciliation commission and, recently, the setting
up of the gacaca courts. Yet the RPF’s ideology and
the persistent security problems have locked the
transition into an authoritarian drift, undermining all
efforts at reconciliation in the short term and
undermining the country’s stability in the long term.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
III. THE AUTHORITARIAN DRIFT OF
THE RWANDAN REGIME
Although the discourse of the Rwandan authorities
emphasises reconciliation, national unity and the
respect for the rights of all, Rwanda has been in the
grip of a hazardous authoritarian drift over the last
three years (corresponding with the extension of the
transition period). Civil society, the press, national
NGOs and exiled, threatened or imprisoned
politicians constantly complain that they are the
victims of human rights violations.
The domain of public criticism has been whittled
away to nothing and an artificial pluralism installed
not only in national bodies and political parties, but
also in the opposition forces of the press and civil
society. No means of expression is possible for
voicing the dissatisfaction and demands of the
different segments of the population.
A. “CONSENSUAL MODE OF
    RWANDAN-STYLE UNITY
1. The façade of pluralism
a.
GOVERNING”
-
The official absence of political opposition
Eight political parties36 participate in the so-called
consensual mode of governing, in line with the spirit
of the Arusha Accords for transition. Of these, only
the Rwandan Democratic Movement (MDR) and the
Liberal Party (PL) have made sporadic attempts to
challenge the party line and counter the RPF’s
growing power.
In the government set up after the RPF’s military
victory in July 1994, the MDR obtained the post of
prime minister for Faustin Twagiramungu. Yet from
1995, the government coalition that was supposed to
be led by the MDR collapsed. After a major dispute
with the RPF, the leading lights of the MDR
retreated into exile. Since 1995, despite keeping the
post of prime minister for the MDR, the RPF has
played on the ambiguities in the party and worked to
destroy its main opponent37. The MDR was and
36
RPF, PL, PSD, MDR, PDC, PDI, PSR, UPDR.
The events of 1959 are not seen by the RPF as a social
revolution, but the continuation of a divisionist policy enacted
by the colonial power and seconded by the Catholic Church.
37
Page 10
remains divided between the supporters of the hard-
line approach taken by the ex-PARMEHUTU, and
the partisans of more inclusive politics. When the
party’s steering committee38 changed on 23 July
1999 and Pierre Célestin Rwigyema, the MDR
prime minister39 went into exile in 2000, the party
lost a leader of national stature40. Weakened by its
internal squabbling and by its inability to garner
support in the hills, the party was no longer any real
opposition for the RPF, to such an extent that its
general secretary declared it would not be fielding a
candidate in the 2003 presidential elections41.
The PL, which until 2000 was considered an RPF
ally, showed signs of a desire for independence by
attempting to take over the cause of genocide
survivors. The former president of the National
Assembly, Joseph Sebarenzi (PL), also attempted to
re-establish the Assembly’s role as an opposition
force by launching parliamentary investigations into
certain RPF ministers. However, since he was
considered to be the voice of genocide survivors, he
offered a Tutsi alternative to the current regime and
challenged the legitimacy of the RPF’s line on the
genocide. He was forced to resign from his post at
the assembly in January 2000, and went into exile in
America via Uganda42.
The rise of influential politicians in the official
parties was thus systematically halted, leaving the
latter deprived of credible leaders. The Forum of
parties, established in 1994, controls and coordinates
the activities of parties and presides over the
appointment of deputies, without having to obey any
rules of transparency. The ban on local political
meetings and the creation of local branches prevents
opposition parties from spreading across the country.
Yet the advocates of MDR Parmehutu see themselves as the
heirs of these events.
38
Following the drafting of the “Contribution by the
Democratic Republican Movement in the search for solutions
to problems encountered by Rwanda”, claiming that the
events of 1959 were indeed a social revolution, a provocative
message for the RPF.
39
Following accusations of corruption by the National
Assembly and of participation in the genocide.
40
Plus the arrest of Pierre Gakwandi (former secretary
general of the MDR) following an interview in le Partisan
on the RPF’s involvement in the MDR’s internal politics. He
is still awaiting judgement.
41
ICG interview ICG, Marara, Secretary-General of the
MDR, Kigali, June 2002.
42
Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Rwanda: From the Search
for Security to Human Rights Abuses.” April 2000.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
With no grass-roots structures, they are little more
than an elite group of leaders whose political combat
is limited to obtaining positions of responsibility.
Even if their activities were liberalised once the new
constitution is adopted in 2003, they would not be in
a position to re-establish themselves in three months
and campaign for the July 2003 elections. In any
case, they were only consulted in an extremely
marginal fashion for the drafting of the new
constitution.
At the other extreme, while the RPF has banned
grass-roots political meetings, it allows itself to co-
opt local elites in a systematic fashion. Every
weekend, RPF meetings are held on a sectoral43
level, bringing together all educated persons44.
People are summoned by personal invitation, with
the threat of repressive measures hanging over them
if they choose not to participate. The RPF is clearly
in a phase of open recruitment and systematic
mobilisation, yet at the same time bans other parties
from doing this.
b.
The concentration of power around the RPF
The RPF’s monopoly on power is not only
reflected in the disappearance of opposition parties
and the official imposition of consensus-based
government for affairs of State. The way positions
of responsibility, both in the public domain and the
private, are distributed is also significant. Here are
a few examples45:
! 11 out of 12 prefects are affiliated with the
 RPF. They will be supervising the elections.
! 13 out of 15 ambassadors are affiliated with
 the RPF.
! 7 out of 9 security services are headed up by
 the RPF. The two others are supervised by the
RPF in junior posts.
! The chief prosecutor, head of the Court of
 Cassation and head of the Constitutional Court
are all RPF members.
! 8 out of 9 Rwandan banks are managed by
 RPF members.
43
ICG interview, Kigali, October 2002.
The higher the level of education, the higher the level of
recruitment (district, province).
45
ICG document, see full list in appendix.
Page 11
! All the institutes of higher education are run
 by RPF members.
! 25 out of 29 leaders of the top state-run
 companies in Rwanda are RPF members.
In the present system, ministers are drawn from all
the political parties, but the vast majority of
secretary-generals at the ministries are RPF
members. 12 out of 16 ministries have an RPF
secretary general, and at the remaining four
ministries, the ministers are RPF. Exiled opponents
who were once ministers criticise this practice,
saying it amounts to giving the ministers a post but
no power, while the pro-RPF secretary-generals
wield the real power46.
In response to criticism, the RPF justifies this
concentration of power by the state of emergency
that prevailed after the genocide. Most of the
moderate politicians were killed, and those in the
Hutu power branch went into exile. To make up for
the lack of politicians, the RPF had to urgently
appoint qualified individuals from its own ranks. But
since 1995 this monopolisation has intensified. All
attempts to challenge it have ended in exile, or
imprisonment on the charge of divisionism, the
sudden accusation of implication in the genocide or
embezzlement.
2.
The exile or arrest of opponents
Since 1994, there has been a real discrepancy
between the consensual discourse of the RPF and the
ostracising of numerous Hutu politicians (accused of
genocide denial or divisionism) and Tutsi politicians
(accused of corruption).
The first schism emerged within the transition
government as early as 1995, with the departure of
Seth Sendashonga (Minister of the Interior
RPF/Hutu) followed by Faustin Twagiramungu
(Prime Minister MDR/Hutu) and Colonel Theoneste
Lizinde (APR headquarters/Hutu). A section of the
Hutu moderates disassociated themselves from the
government, accusing the RPF of monopolising
power and betraying the spirit of the Arusha Accords
of which it claimed to be the guardian. They were
soon followed by their supporters. Five years later, it
was the turn of the representatives of genocide
survivors, symbolised by Joseph Sebarenzi, to leave
the country. This second fissure is indicative of the
44
46
ICG interview, Brussels, June 2002.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
tensions that appeared inside the Tutsi elite. This
was not limited to the political class, but was also
evident within the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).
A number of soldiers decided to desert its ranks. The
RPF accused the survivors of being monarchists and
of planning the return of King Kigeri V through
armed attack by creating the King’s army47.
The exclusion of individuals who challenged the
party line became even more far-reaching with the
banning of the Party for Democracy and
Regeneration (PDR) in 2001, followed by the arrest
of its founder, Pasteur Bizimungu, President of
Rwanda from 1994 to 200048. The saga of the PDR-
Ubuyanja is the most telling example of the RPF’s
authoritarian drift. Faced with the dissident opinions
of one of its own, the RPF was incapable of
accepting criticism or even of feigning indifference.
Moreover, when Bizimungu and his entourage
decided to ignore the threats and pressure aimed at
blocking the launch of the PDR – including a ban on
the party in May 2001, putting its leader under house
arrest in June 2001, an interview with Bizimungu by
Jeune Afrique in July 2001, the arrest of alleged
members, and the arrest of Bizimungu and
Ntakiruntika in April 2002 – the regime showed
itself to be incapable of taking political criticism and
responding to it, and preferred to shelter behind the
law. It appears that in private, many people report
that the ex-president intended to campaign along
ethnic lines. But it was not until long after the
accused had appeared in court, that the case was
revealed to be a complete non-starter, and the
prosecution’s arguments turned out to be
unconvincing and contradictory49.
In total, since 1995 no fewer than forty Rwandan
political leaders have taken the path of exile.
According to the RPF, these exclusions are a
necessary stage in purging the political class of its
corrupt or reactionary elements.
This approach is part of the ideological logic of
rebuilding the political class on a new foundation50.
But this ultimately reinforces the monopolisation of
power and annihilates any possibility of national
Page 12
critical debate. Moreover, the excluded opponents
generally try and find allies and fight against the
government from the outside, thus increasing the
security threat.
Eight years after the start of the transition period,
the exile of politicians and imprisonment of Pastor
Bizimungu are chipping away at the image of
consensus-based government that the regime would
like to portray. In fact, there is no genuine, legal,
political opposition in Rwanda today. In view of
the political control that also hangs over civil
society and the media, a similar observation can
clearly be made.
B.
A DISCIPLINED CIVIL SOCIETY
Starting in 1990, Rwandan civil society began to
benefit from the democratisation process under the
Habyarimana regime and to focus its activities on
defending human rights. Of course, the genocide
broke its momentum since the majority of its
members were killed or went into exile. Barely
reconstructed, it now suffers from the new leaders’
obsession with political control. The activities of
Rwandan associations are only tolerated as long as
they are compatible with the official government
line. The minute they introduce any dissonance or
difference of opinion about how the country is
governed, or about repression or co-option in the
State apparatus, the independence of these
associations is threatened.
The collective of genocide survivor associations
called Ibuka, is the most notable example of this
phenomenon. Through Ibuka, the survivors have
tried to demand an improvement of their economic
and financial situation and to obtain significant
representation of survivors in the country’s
institutions51. They have also violently challenged the
political manipulation of justice and the way in
which the lists of genocide suspects are managed by
the government. They contest the fact that, for
internal political reasons, the current government is
co-opting Hutu personalities who are suspected of
having participated in the genocide, while at the same
time keeping “files” on their possible guilt in order to
47
HRW, “Rwanda: From the Search for Security to Human
Rights Abuses.” April 2000.
48
Pasteur Bizimungu rallied the RPF in 1990, led the
negotiations in Arusha for his movement, and then became
president of Rwanda from 1994 to 2000.
49
Cf. Appendix C, the case of PDR-Ubuyanja.
50
Cf. chapter I.
51
The survivors feel excluded from the running of the
government and accuse the government of failing to pay
them a significant amount of financial compensation. ICG
interview with survivors in Rwanda and in exile.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
guarantee their docility and support for governmental
consensus52.
Ibuka’s ability to mobilise and contest was
neutralised by applying increasing political pressure
on its most anti-establishment leaders. Former Ibuka
vice president, Josué Kayijaho, for example, was
assaulted by soldiers on two occasions before he
went into exile in 2000. His brother, Assiel Kabera,
who was suspected of being a dissident and leading
the French-speaking survivors in a fight against RPF
leaders53, was assassinated in 2000 in murky
circumstances. The replacement of Josué Kayijaho
and the arrival of Antoine Mugesera as Ibuka’s
leader brought an end to the criticism that the
survivor organisation was anti-government. The new
president, who was appointed in 2000, was one of
the co-founders of the internal branch of the RPF in
1990. A member of the RPF’s Politburo, he was also
an advisor to the Minister of the Interior, appointed
to serve on the boards of directors of quasi-public
companies and held a high-ranking position in
Rwandex, the main coffee exporter54.
As a general rule, in a country where educated
executives are few and far between, the ability of
associations to remain dynamic and to survive by
meeting the criteria of donors frequently falls upon
one or two people. Consequently, in order to weaken
an association, one need only “offer” a government
post to one of its leaders. It is an “offer” that is hard,
even dangerous, for such leaders to refuse. For
example, Solina Nyirahabimana, a human rights
activist in charge of the women’s association called
Haguruka, was appointed to be a presidential advisor
in 2000 and was subsequently recruited as a member
of the RPF (and elected as a commissioner during the
last convention).
For several years, two human rights associations, the
LDGL (League of People’s Rights in the Great Lakes
region) and Liprodhor (League for the Promotion
and Defence of Human Rights), have been especially
exposed to the wrath of the government. In
particular, the government accuses Liprodhor of
being too political and of supporting the Hutu
52
The most obvious example is the case of former Prime
Minister Rwigyema. Even though Ibuka has been accusing
him of genocide since 1997, it was not until after he went
into exile that the government looked into these accusations.
53
HRW, “Rwanda: From the Search for Security to Human
Rights Abuses”, April 2000.
54
ICG interview, Kiagli, June 2002.
Page 13
opposition55. For example, Liprodhor was threatened
when it published a communiqué on the arrest of
alleged members of the Party for Democracy and
Regeneration (PDR), even though it was only
criticising the lack of compliance with legal
procedures.
These associations continue their activities in spite
of everything, thanks to the support of some Western
chancelleries56. In order to avoid confrontation with
international donors, the Rwandan security apparatus
simply watches them closely, but these associations
work in fear on a daily basis and have to censure
themselves in order to survive57.
Thus, Rwandan leaders feel that a divisionist
political drift clearly exists in civil society and they
have decided to regulate the activities of civil society
through freedom-destroying legislation. Law number
20/2000 on associations legitimises total political
control over the activities of civil society, giving the
executive branch the means to suspend any
association at any time in a totally discretionary
way58. Associations must be able to produce
documents concerning their activities for the
authorities at any time. In fact, they may even be
banned for investigating human rights violations by
government agents. As the LDGL pointed out:
“The draft legislation on the protocol for
implementing the law on ASBLs [associations]
illustrates another type of barrier to freedoms.
Indeed, this legislation stipulates that NGOs
must belong to the district ‘forums’ (...), that
their projects must receive prior authorisation
from administrative authorities before being
submitted to donors, that their staff must be
registered with the authorities, that the entire
patrimony of NGOs belongs to the government
as a matter of law, etc. Since the promulgation
55
In particular with respect to its June 2002 communiqué
concerning the arrest of members of the PDR.
56
ICG interview with LDGL and Liprodhor, Kigali, June
2002.
57
ICG interview, Kigali 2002.
58
For example, Article 24: “The Minister having justice in
his portfolio upon request by the authority mentioned in
Article 8 of this law and considering any organisation’s
actions are likely to be [a] threat to law, public order and
good moral standards, may order the suspension for a three-
month period of the organisation’s activities. In case after
this period the Ministry does not disclose its opinion, the
organisation may continue its activities.”
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
of the new law on ASBLs, only Ibuka has
obtained legal status.59”
The case of the association AMI (Modest and
Innocent Association)60, some of whose members
have been accused of “national security offences,”
speaks volumes. These members were arrested
following the publication of articles deemed to be too
divisive in Ubuntu magazine. This magazine uses the
term Ubuyanja (which means convalescence,
“Rwanda is like a sick person recovering from a
lengthy illness”). However, Ubuyanja is also the
concept that former President Pasteur Bizimungu
used for his dissident political movement, the Party
for Democracy and Regeneration (PDR). With the
creation of the PDR and its appropriation of the word
Ubuyanja, the expression has become politically
incorrect. Consequently, Ubuntu magazine61 was
targeted by the authorities. The accusation advanced
by the government is that of “sedition, illegal
publication of Ubuntu magazine with respect to press
law no. 54/91 of 15 November 1991 and illegal
operation of AMI in violation of law no. 20/2000 of
1 April 2002 on non-profit associations62.” Because
of the law on associations, and because AMI was not
legally registered, the courts can put an end to AMI’s
activities, whether or not the charges are valid,
without offering any form of appeal63.
C.
AN ATROPHIED AND MUZZLED
PRESS
The role of the media in the rise of “Hutu power”
and in the organisation of the genocide has made the
issue of communication media a sensitive one. Due
to the existence of Radio des Milles Collines
(RTLM) and Radio Rwanda’s swing to “Hutu
power”, only two local non-governmental radio
stations, which are funded by international projects,
were authorised in Rwanda after the genocide.
After the RPF came to power, the press had begun to
be more diversified. Newspapers such as Newslines
59
LDGL, “Entre la violence impunie et la misère” May 2002.
Catholic organisation for human rights, forum for
discussion and action for national peace and reconciliation.
Fact finding mission to Rwanda, 30 May 2002.
61
Three editions were published between 2000 and 2001.
Communication vehicle of the AMI association.
62
Tony Kuramba, 7 February (ARI).
63
The two prisoners were released but cannot leave Butare as
the proceedings are still underway. This is a typical example
of a case that should be heard by an ombudsman.
60
Page 14
and Le Tribun du Peuple participated alongside the
insipid government press, Imvaho and La Nouvelle
Relève, in the debate on the reconstruction of
Rwanda. In addition to these newspapers was a
private news agency L’Agence Rwandaise
d’Information/Rwanda News Agency (ARI/RNA),
founded in 1995. These media also helped to create
an open forum for public debate, which had never
existed in Rwanda except during a short period from
1992 – 199364. Beyond covering regional news,
many of their articles dealt with the problems of
daily life in the urban populations, the high cost of
living and the difficulties linked to the omnipresence
of the government and police apparatus. These
various media stood out in particular because they
criticised the problems of nepotism and corruption
among groups of leaders.
Since 1998, each stage in the concentration of power
seems to have been accompanied by additional
restrictions on the subjects the press could cover.
The founder of Tribun du Peuple, Jean-Pierre
Mugabe, went into exile in 1998. Former president
of the Parliament Joseph Sebarenzi Kabuye, who
was formerly a member of the editorial board of this
newspaper and a journalist with Rwanda Libération,
continued to work with and encourage the press.
After he went into exile in January 2000, Imboni
newspaper published a special edition on the role the
RPF played in his dismissal. The same newspaper
also mentioned the increase in the number of
Rwandan citizens in exile, especially genocide
survivors65.
The first edition of the paper had barely been
published on 22 February 2000 when the newspaper
was banned by the authorities and all copies on sale
were seized66. A few days later, during a public press
conference on 4 March, Paul Kagame directly
attacked the journalists who had contributed to this
special edition, asserting that they had been hired by
the international community to torpedo public order.
The next day, the two journalists, Déo Mushayidi
and Jason Muhayimana, left the country. The third
journalist, Jean-Claude Nkubito, followed shortly
thereafter, officially leaving for Nairobi on an
assignment for AFP (his regular employer). One
64
During this period, there was a climate of liberalisation
and journalistic euphoria in Kigali.
65
ICG interview with Rwandan journalists, Kigali, January
2002.
66
ICG interview with Rwandan journalists, Kigali, January
2002.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
week later, the printer, Boniface Rutayisire, left the
country after his offices and all the buildings of his
central publishing house were ransacked.
In addition to these mounting pressures, the Rwandan
Information Agency (ARI), a private information
agency, was forced to change stockholders and
became totally subservient to the RPF. The
composition of its board of directors in 2000 is
indicative: Major Emmanuel Ndahiro (RPA officer
and advisor to Paul Kagame), Major Wilson
Rutayisire (RPA officer who died in 2000 and former
director of the Rwandan office of information –
ORINFOR), Dr. Donald Kaberuka (Minister of
Finance, RPF), Gérald Gahima (Attorney General,
RPF), Seth Kamanzi (former Secretary-General of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and currently
Ambassador to Nairobi, RFP), Ndoba Mugunga
(businessman and husband of Jeannette Kagame’s
sister, Chamber of Commerce), Alfred Kalisa (CEO
of the Banque de Commerce de Développement et
d’Investissement – BCDI, and economic advisor to
Paul Kagame), Charles Murigande (Secretary-
General of the RPF), Privat Rutazibwa (in charge of
writing the history of the RPF movement, RPF
officer, former priest and official founder of the
information agency), Jean-Baptiste Kayigamba
(journalist, co-founder of the agency, RPF officer),
Jean-Claude Nkubito (journalist, co-founder of the
agency, RPF officer), and Philibert Muzima
(journalist, co-founder of the agency). Further to
pressure from the new board of directors, three of the
four co-founding journalists left the agency67.
In 2001, the English language newspaper Newslines
was one of the last remaining independent
newspapers. However, it faced numerous difficulties.
Its often critical coverage of the conflict in the DRC
provoked the wrath of the government, which
pressured its main advertiser, Rwandacell, to stop
advertising in the paper. Without any advertising,
Newslines found itself in a difficult financial situation
and was forced to publish the paper on an irregular
basis. For the past eighteen months, three of the five
newspapers considered to be the most independent in
Kigali68 have also stopped publishing because of
political pressure69.
Page 15
! Newsline. In May 2001, its editor, John Eddy
 Mugabi left the country for Holland. Accused
of being a member of the PDR, he fled and his
paper ceased to exist.
! Le Partisan. In January 2002, Amiel Nkuliza,
 owner and editor, also took the path of exile.
He was imprisoned and then released after
publishing an article criticising the RPF’s
 stronghold on the MDR.
! Rwanda Herald. On 19 May 2002 in Kigali,
 the paper’s Ugandan director, Asuman Bisiika,
  was escorted to the border by the authorities.
 He had criticised the imprisonment of Pasteur
Bizimungu, as well as Rwanda’s immigration
 policy.
! Umuseso. Journalist Shyaka Kanuma left the
 country in May 2001 after attempting to
interview Pasteur Bizimungu. The paper
became the government’s enemy. Its journalists
 were subject to intimidation for over a year70.
On 17 and 18 July 2002, three Umuseso
journalists were imprisoned. Their involvement
in the alleged events was unclear. They were
released following an investigation.
In a report published in May 2002, the LDGL also
drew attention to the detention of three journalists
from Radio Rwanda: Dominique Makeli, Tatiana
Mukakibibi and Joseph Ruyenzi, two journalists
from the national television station: Gédéon
Mushimiyimana and Ladislas Parmehutu, and a
journalist from Indorerwamo magazine: Joseph
Habyarimana. They were allegedly kept in detention
“on unclear charges”. The report therefore concludes
that “Rwandan public opinion is petrified and does
not dare speak out on issues of public interest that
concern the political management of the country71”.
The draft legislation on the press proposed by the
Parliament in 2001 intensified the debate on the
muzzling of the media. The bill indicated that
journalists could receive the death penalty for
incitement to genocide. In the end, Paul Kagame
refused to have the bill adopted as drafted because in
70
67
ICG interview with ARI journalists.
The last two to be published are Kinyamateka and Umuseso.
69
RSF Reports 2002, LDGL publication in May 2002, Human
rights report “Fact-finding mission to Rwanda” 30 May 2002.
68
“Threatening Messages and Visit to Umuseso” RIMEG, 1
February 2002. On 18 and 25 May 2002, Ismail Mbonigaba
was interrogated twice on the subject of an ironic article on
one of Kagame’s speeches. On 13 November 2001, Elly
Mcdowell Kalisa was arrested at the Gatuna border post and
copies of Umuseso were confiscated.
71
“Entre la violence impunie et la misère”, Report on the
human rights situation, LDGL, May 2002.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
his opinion, and rightly so, the ban on denying the
genocide should not be limited to the press.
According to the Head of State, Rwanda should
instead adopt a general law on issues of genocide
denial, incitement to genocide and divisionist
activities. The main issue, therefore, is distinguishing
between those ideas that are divisionist and genocidal
and those that are not. This cannot reasonably include
all alternative political expression.
However, in the bill that was finally passed, the
government came back with same idea by placing
the press under supervision. Indeed, the bill that was
adopted in May 2002 provides that:
! A High Council of the Press shall be
 established, which shall not be independent
from the government, Article 73, “The High
 Council shall be attached to the President of the
Republic’s office,” Article 75, “The structure,
     organisation and functions of the High Council
    of the Press shall be determined by Presidential
   decree.”
! Criminal responsibility is extended to sellers of
 newspapers. Article 88, “The following persons
  listed in order below, shall be prosecuted as
 perpetrators for offences committed using the
written press: the Director of the publication or
the publisher, failing that, the editor-in-chief,
failing that, the authors, failing that the printers,
and failing that, the sellers, distributors or bill
posters.”
This law does not protect journalists. Fear of being
accused by the government of being a genocidal
media silences even the slightest desire to challenge
the establishment. For example, Minister Nyandwi
compared Le Partisan and Umuseso to the hate paper
Kangura without any proof to back up his
accusations72. Granted, the press does not always
behave in a professional and responsible manner.
And, revisionism and genocide denial are realities in
contemporary Rwanda that can appear in the print
media and must be opposed73. However, the RPF
cannot use this as a pretext to suppress all criticism of
the way in which it manages the affairs of the State.
In Rwanda, as elsewhere, the media must have an
independent corporatist structure that is made up
exclusively of members of the profession and that is
Page 16
responsible for ensuring professionalism and
compliance with the code of ethics by its members.
The judicial arsenal should only be used as the final
penal recourse in cases of serious violations of the
code of ethics. In the end, the absence of a critical
public forum and the lack of challenge to the
establishment encourages the development of parallel
discourse and runs the risk of ruining the efforts at
reconciliation.
D.
Rwanda is a country where appearances are
deceptive. Order, security and the state of
infrastructures are tangible realities that can be
attributed to the government. However, these
appearances tend to hide the persistence of certain
ways of thinking such as rumours, prophecy, and
veiled criticism. Without a public forum, these
criticisms circulate privately in limited groups within
families or at best, in bars. The patterns used to
explain events such as the genocide and the crimes
committed during the war are still partisan and the
two communities are deeply entrenched in antagonist
stereotypes that in essence are mutually exclusive.
1.
Liprodhor communiqué, June 2002.
73
Cf. the editorial in Le Partisan published in Appendix A.
Reinforcement of revisionism and
genocide denial
The fact that some of the Hutu elite have a hand in
running the government is deemed in private to be
merely a window dressing. Part of this elite, in
breaking with the system, feels that the government
does not give them any decision-making posts and
does not trust them at all74. Whether officially
included in the government or not, there is
resentment building among this elite. Some of its
members even explain their collaboration with
government structures as a wait-and-see strategy, as
they look forward to the hour of change that will
reverse the balance of power75. The belief of some
in prophecies or rumours from soothsayers, who
proclaim that a new war is on the verge of erupting
and that this war will cause the demise of the
current government, provides an irrational
justification of this resentment. In private, some
Hutu leaders also decry the “ongoing humiliation”
74
72
THE RISE OF A PARALLEL
DISCOURSE
Bizimungu speech, Jeune Afrique, July 2001, ICG
interview, Brussels, June 2002.
75
ICG interview with a Hutu member of the RPF.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
that “these arrogant and aristocratic leaders” inflict
on them76. Consequently, Hutus vehemently reject
the generalised guilt that weighs on them and
equate reconciliation, as proposed by the RPF, to
submission to the authorities. The lack of public
debate on the genocide, the crimes committed by
the RPF during the war, and the fact that it is
impossible for Hutus to claim their dead and give
them a proper burial facilitates the development of
revisionist sentiment and denial of the genocide.
At the beginning of the 1990s, regional (North-
South) differences within the Hutu political class
constituted the main political divide in Rwanda77.
The increase in political parties and the war with the
RPF at the start of the 90s further weakened the
popular support base of the Habyarimana regime.
The genocide of the Tutsis proved to be a perverse
means of creating a scapegoat and imposing
cohesion on the Hutu community around the gains
of the 1959 social revolution78. By forcing massive
participation by the rural population, one of the
primary effects of the genocide was to break the
strong neighbourly ties between Hutus and Tutsis79
and to eliminate one of the main obstacles to ethnic
awareness amongst the rural populations.
The legacy of the genocide includes not only the
severing of regional ties and the dominance of
ethnic-based identifiers, but also the claiming of
victim status by all the communities. In the Hutu
community today, talk of government repression and
of the massacres of refugees in Eastern Congo in
1996 and 1997 has become the main source of ethnic
conscious raising and justifies the latent or explicit
denial of the genocide against the Tutsis.
Discussion of past violence is centred around the
death of relatives who died either in 1994-95 in
Rwanda or in 1997-98 in the DRC. In fact, the scale
of the violence inflicted upon the Tutsis during the
genocide is being minimised, even denied. Some
Hutu intellectuals have developed a structured
negation of the genocide that is based on two
elements80: the double genocide theory, which
circulated in refugee circles after the genocide, and a
rejection of the victim rhetoric that the current
leaders developed. According to this theory, the RPF
Page 17
is responsible for the war of 1990-94 and the
genocide of the Tutsis was only a response to the
violence committed by the RPF. The massacres of
refugees from 1996-98 during the two wars in the
Congo have only reinforced this conviction.
Likewise, among certain Hutu intellectuals, the
commemoration ceremonies and the construction of
memorials to the genocide victims give rise to a
parallel discourse of genocide denial. According to
them, the bodies that are displayed are, in fact, those
of Hutus killed by the RPF and the memorials only
serve to shed limelight on this or that Minister from
the region where the memorial is being built81. This
denial is extremely dangerous since it tends to
reduce the genocide to an instrument of propaganda
fabricated by the government.
Consequently, one of the main political stakes in
Rwanda today is in the way in which the official
memory of the genocide is managed. The political
battle is being fought through historical truths and
non-truths. The fact that the Democratic Forces for
the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)82 has revisited the
revisionist and denial theories is undoubtedly
contributing to a wider diffusion of such theories.
In the urban areas, denial of the genocide also tends
to be an outlet for the feelings of marginalisation that
some educated Hutus feel. In reality, ethnicity is still
very much a secondary factor in discrimination.
Even more than ethnicity, often one’s personal ties
are the prevailing factor in the allocation of jobs, and
the genocide severed a lot of family ties between
Hutus and Tutsis. Decades long exile has also
weakened family relationships between the diaspora
and those who remained in the country.
The weakening of inter-ethnic family ties is coupled
with divisions in terms of social life. The high cost
of living and barely making ends meet at the end of
the month have caused many to frequent bars less
often. These bars are essential places in male social
life. The scars of the genocide and the ethnic divide
are especially apparent in these social outlets. In
Kigali, that fact that Hutus do not frequent bars that
Tutsis frequent leads to a vicious circle of distrust. A
Hutu from Nyamirambo might say that he does not
frequent bars in Kicyukiro out of fear of Tutsi
soldiers and of having his conversations overheard
and interpreted as being hostile to the government. A
76
ICG interview, Kigali, June 2002.
Guichaoua, op. cit. Braud, op. cit., Prunier, op. cit.
78
Idem
79
ICG interview, Kigali 2000, 2001, 2002.
80
ICG interview, Kigali/Hutu Diaspora, 2000, 2001, 2002.
77
81
ICG interview, Kigali, February 2001.
www.fdlr.org – see: press releases. ICG interview, FDLR,
Brussels, June 2002.
82
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Tutsi from the same neighbourhood might consider
this absence of Hutus to be an indication that Hutus
are organising secret meetings.
Another form of revisionism is also on the rise
among the survivors, who clearly accuse the RPF
of having continued the war even though it was
fully aware of the risks to Tutsis inside the country.
Consequently, they blame the RPF for having
sacrificed Tutsis in the country in order to take
power83.
2.
The increase of disagreements in the tutsi
communities
Finally, just like the rise of Hutu revisionism and
denial, the inability to freely express criticism and
the lack of possibilities to express discontent also
reinforce tension among the different Tutsi groups
from the various diasporas. As much as the security
apparatus is united around the threat of a resurgence
of anti-Tutsi genocidal movements, it is just as
divided with respect to the consequences of power
being concentrated among the “Ugandan group” in
the government.
The tensions are fuelled by the difficulties of daily
life and the feeling among the Burundian and
Congolese diasporas that they are marginalised from
power. In returning to Rwanda, the various diasporas
are hoping to find a land of “milk and honey” and the
reformist voluntarism of the RPF should allow for a
rapid return to prosperity. However, the range of
structural difficulties in the Rwandan economy have
been underestimated. Among these difficulties are
subsistence farming, the setting up of territorial
enclaves, the lack of industries and the absence of an
independent private sector – a factor that gets glossed
over. Moreover, the genocide committed by the
“Hutu power” has destroyed what few infrastructures
were in the country. At first, the desire to get beyond
the aftermath of the genocide encouraged former
Tutsi refugees to mobilise around the issue of
reconstruction. However, eight years after the
genocide, the ongoing material difficulties have
given rise to a growing feeling of dissatisfaction (cost
of daily life, housing problems, lack of
83
Some even go so far as to accuse the RPF of having
assassinated President Habyarimana.
Page 18
infrastructures, etc.)84 that boils below the surface
since there is no possibility of expressing it.
Within the Burundian and Congolese diasporas85, just
as with the Tutsi survivors, these difficulties lead to a
stigmatisation of the “Ugandans” or the “left-hand
drivers” – the nickname given to the members of the
former Ugandan diaspora86, who like the members of
the British Commonwealth, “drive on the wrong side
of the road.” In the army, for example, the leading
“Burundian” officers are perceived as being still
under the control of the “Ugandan” officers87. In the
government, members of the diaspora who returned
from Bujumbura note that the last time there was a
“Burundian” in a decision-making position was in
1997.
The mistrust among the diasporas simultaneously
results in a permanent atmosphere of plotting and an
irrational feeling of inevitable violence which, in a
society as traumatised as Rwanda, can prove to be
particularly dangerous. Thus, two prophecies are
circulating around Kigali. The first, which was
started in the Kigali town square by a preacher from
the Congolese diaspora, is a subjective interpretation
of a speech given by President Kagame during the
ceremonies commemorating the genocide in
Kibuye88, during which he took stock of the
government’s actions. Now in the traditional
Rwandan imagination, this speech is similar to the
speeches that former kings gave at the end of their
reign. Thus, some are predicting the end of the
Kagame reign, even going so far as to claim that the
electoral campaign in the northern provinces will be
disastrous for him89. The second prophecy is more
subtle and reveals the trends in the Ugandan clan.
84
In Kigali, the water distribution company is promising
access to drinking water for all inhabitants by 2025...
85
During the rebellion led by Major Masunzu in South Kivu,
the Banyamulenge community in Kigali conducted a
fundraising campaign to support him, which caused a shock
in the Tutsi community.
86
Each Diaspora has a nickname, and all are pejorative: “left
hand drivers” for the “Ugandans” and, because of their
assumed illiteracy, they might also be called Waragi, from
the name of a Ugandan alcohol that they supposedly abuse;
“Dubai” for the “Zairians” since they are considered to be as
unreliable as merchandise from this city; GP (Presidential
Guard – the former praetorians of Habyarimana) for the
“Burundians”’ and “Sopex” for the Tutsis living in Rwanda.
87
Those in charge of the army, the police, foreign intelligence,
military intelligence and emigration/immigration are from the
“Ugandan” group.
88
In April 2002. ICG interview, Kigali, June 2002.
89
ICG interview, Kigali, June 2002.
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
There is an old prediction that foretells a major
catastrophe (the genocide), and says that a Mwega
king (clan of queens in the Rwandan monarchy and
the native clan of Paul Kagame) will come and think
he has ended the catastrophe, but that chaos will
reappear, which is when a second Mwega will
succeed him90. It seems that even within the leaders’
circles, this prophecy is taken very seriously91.
In such a context, the increase of disagreements
reinforces the obsession that the current leaders have
with security. A few quickly quelled incidents
confirm this analysis. In August 2002, a grenade
destroyed the house of Jack Nziza, head of military
intelligence92. Without overly speculating on the role
the opposition played in this event, it is nonetheless
important to wonder about the positioning of the
opposition in exile in these attempts to destabilise
the country.
Page 19
IV. THE STRENGTHENING OF THE
OPPOSITION IN EXILE
The landscape of the opposition in exile has evolved
since 2000. In particular, the fact that some of the
Tutsi survivors and a few of the Hutu personalities
who did not have any responsibility for the genocide
fled Rwanda clearly showed that the political fight
from outside the country was no longer being waged
solely by the leaders of “Hutu power”. The creation
of the Rwandan Democratic Alliance (ADR), the
Alliance for Democracy and National Reconciliation
(ADRN) – IGIHANGO93 has strengthened the
perception of diversity among the opposition.
A.
THE ORIGINS OF THE UNARMED
EXTERNAL OPPOSITION94
In April 1996, Faustin Twagiramungu, former Prime
Minister, and Seth Sendashonga, former Minister of
the Interior, fled Rwanda and founded the
“Resistance Forces for Democracy” (FDR), based in
Nairobi. These two Hutu personalities, one from the
moderate wing of the MDR and the other from the
RPF, had no responsibility in the genocide and
enjoyed a certain political credibility in Rwanda.
However, once they were operating from outside the
country, they were cut off from their support base in
Rwanda and were faced with a Hutu refugee
community that was becoming more and more
radical, whether or not it had participated in the
genocide. The exile from Rwanda due to the RPF
victory in 1994, the attack on the Hutu refugee
camps, the deaths of tens, even hundreds of
thousands of Hutus in the various massacres during
the first war in the Congo, and the difficulties of
refugee life all accentuated the extremist position.
Given this general trend, the FDR could not find a
moderate political base. Consequently, the movement
was obliged to align itself with the Democratic Rally
for the Return of Refugees (RDR)95, which emanates
directly from “Hutu power”. Seth Sendashonga paid
for this alliance with his own life. In May 1998,
armed men assassinated him right in the streets of
93
90
ICG interview, Kigali, Brussels, Nairobi, 2002.
ICG interview, Kigali June 2002
92
ICG interviews, July/August 2002, Kigali
91
ADRN is made up of the FDLR (Hutu allegiance), ARENA
(Tutsi allegiance) and Nation (Tutsi monarchist movement).
94
ICG interviews with members of the opposition in Nairobi,
Brussels, Paris, Kigali and Kampala.
95
See ICG, “Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-starting
DDRRR to prevent further war,” 14 December 2001, ICG
Africa Report N°38.
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Nairobi. This act led to the neutralisation of the FDR
and the flight of dissident politicians, many of whom
left East Africa and contact with the refugees and
sought refuge in the West.
Since 2000, Tutsi politicians who are genocide
survivors and Tutsi deserters of the RPA have joined
the Hutu diaspora. The survivors feel they are the big
losers in the RPF victory. Having lost their families
during the genocide, they feel that the government
response to their suffering is insufficient and they
criticise the government for excluding them from
power in a government dominated by English
speakers. Joesph Sebarenzi, former President of the
Assembly, was the first on a long list of Tutsi
opponents to leave Rwanda (December 1999/2000)
and join former founding members of the RPF who
have become dissidents, or Hutu politicians who
never found their place in Kigali.
The Alliance for National Regeneration (ARENA)
was established in March 2001 in the United States,
while NATION was founded in Belgium in
February 2001. These two francophone movements
are considered to be Tutsi-run movements. ARENA
brings together many personalities from the political
class that emerged in Rwanda after the genocide and
the RPF victory and proposes as its platform to fight
against the RPF’s drift towards authoritarianism.
Among the ranks of ARENA are Joseph Sebarenzi
(Tutsi genocide survivor and former president of the
Parliament until 2000), Pierre Célestin Rwigyema
(former Primer Minister, MDR), Augustin Kamongi
(Rwandan refugee in Burundi and member of the
RPF in the USA from 1990 to 2000), Deus
Kagiraneza (RPA deserter and former RPF deputy in
the transition Assembly), Joesph Ngarambe
(formerly PSD from 1991 to 1994 and a moderate
Hutu who is renowned for his fight against the
genocidal ideology, and in particular, for working
with the ICTR to track down and try the perpetrators
of the genocide). This movement is the first
opposition force to be born out of disagreements
within the RPF.
A clan of monarchists also exists, but it is extremely
divided. The NATION movement proposes
implementing a system of parliamentary monarchy
in Rwanda, hoping to recreate a context favourable
to national unity and reconciliation by returning to a
system of cultural and historical values that are
familiar to Rwandans. However, the movement has
not convinced the Hutus who remember the royal
government as being a Tutsi government, nor has it
Page 20
convinced the RPF, which sees the king as a rival96.
Finally, the followers of King Kigeri feel that the
proposed parliamentary monarchy only gives the
king symbolic power to represent the Rwandan
nation97. King Kigeri does not seem to support the
idea and his followers are not willing to accept a
powerless monarchy with no ability to allocate posts.
Nevertheless, the NATION movement continues to
assert that the executive branch should be in the
hands of a Prime Minister.
B.
THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE
ARMED OPPOSITION
Since the end of 1996, the dismantling of the refugee
camps and the dispersion of people and units into the
forests of the Congo and into neighbouring countries
has considerably weakened the RDR, which was
founded in the refugee camps after the Rwandan
government fled Kigali in 1994. Between 1998 and
2000, groups of Hutu rebels who survived the
AFDL’s efforts to track them down in the Congo
were essentially operating thanks to support from
Kinshasa and the anarchy that reigned in Eastern
Congo, but were not represented by any visible
political structure. The Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) appeared in May
200098. This was the first political movement to call
itself the spokesperson for the Rwandan Hutu
military forces active in the Congo99.
The FDLR is a political structure created by the
Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR) in an
attempt to eliminate the movement’s negative image.
Its political representatives did not participate in the
genocide, either because they were not in Rwanda
during the 1990-1994 war, or because they were part
of the opposition but do not necessarily distinguish
themselves from its ideology.
Officially, the FDLR denies its ties with the ALiR,
which organised the insurrection in the Northwest in
1997-1998, and claims to have separate military
units. Moreover, the FDLR considers the ALiR to be
96
ICG interview, Brussels, June 2002.
ICG interview in Brussels with members of NATION,
June 2002.
98
First communiqué on 6 July 2000.
99
See ICG Africa Report N°38: “Disarmament in the Congo:
Jump-starting DDRRR to prevent further war”, 14 December
2001.
97
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Page 21
non-existent100. However, most observers agree that
the military leadership of the FDLR is still dominated
by ex-FAR officers, some of whom have changed
their names. Even though the majority of the troops
are not ex-FAR or militiamen, the movement has not
gained credibility. The recent arrests of Tharcisse
Renzaho in the DRC and Augustin Bizimungu in
Angola are not enough to exonerate the FDLR or to
prove that the underlying ideology behind their
action is not violently anti-Tutsi.
the RPF in 1988. Then, at the end of 1995, he
left the RPF and sought refuge in Bukavu. At
that time, Hakizabera denounced the massacres
perpetrated by the RPA between 1990 and 1995
in Rwanda and distanced himself from the
movement because he deemed it to be criminal.
He crossed the Congo on foot, fleeing ADFL
rebel troops and Rwandan troops. He took
refuge in Congo-Brazzaville and then in Italy.
He then integrated himself into the Hutu rebel
groups and joined the FDLR102.
The four leading figures in the movement are:
!
! Dr. Ignace Murwanashyaka, President of the
 FDLR. An economist by training, he left to
study in Germany in 1989 and was not in
Rwanda in 1994. Currently, he still lives in
Germany. He was president of RDR-Germany
in 1998 and 1999. The RDR was closely linked
to the ex-FAR headquarters in the former Hutu
refugee camps in the Kivus. The president of
the FDLR evolved in this circle of Hutu
intellectuals close to the “Hutu power” theory.
! Alexis Nshimyimana, FDLR spokesperson and
 administrative secretary of the ADRN. A
journalist, he left to study in Austria in 1992 and
was not in Rwanda in 1994. He founded Radio
Afrika in Vienna in 1997. He has received
several prizes in Austria for his commitment to
journalism. Nevertheless, the Rwandan
government accuses him of belonging to the
circle of intellectuals who started the “Hutu
 power” ideas. He was a member of the Circle
  of Progressive Republicans (CRP) in 1992101.
 The role of this organisation has still not been
clearly identified, but is under investigation by
the ICTR. Alexis Nshimyimana was also the
founder of an association called National Youth
Organisation (ONAJER), which the Kigali
government suspects of having served to recruit
Interahamwe from among the Hutu youth.
!
Christophe Hakizabera, member of the FDLR
steering committee and Vice-President of
ADRN-IGIHANGO. He was an officer in the
Rwandan National Guard from 1971 to 1973.
Following the Habyarimana coup d’état, he left
for Uganda, where he worked for an Italian
NGO operating in northern Uganda. He joined
The presence of important figures who were not
officially involved in the genocide lends an air of
credibility which is neutralised by the fact that some
of the members, such as the President and the
spokesperson, belong to parties born out of the
intellectual circles that instigated the radical Hutu
ideology. Moreover, the political leadership of the
FDLR is paralysed by its military leadership (derived
from the FAR general staff, including persons
wanted by the ICTR), which does not dare to show
itself, but rather, tries to lead the movement from
behind the scenes.
The FDLR appeared on the international political
scene thanks to support from the government of the
DCR. When they were officially presented in Kigali
at the end of 2001, Congolese officials such as
Mwenze Kongolo, the Minister for Internal Security,
were present at their press conference. Likewise
during the meeting that sealed an alliance between
the opposition groups in Bad Honnef, Germany in
May 2002, the FDLR were again accompanied by
Congolese soldiers103. However, it should be noted
that Kinshasa never gave the FDLR the means to
102
100
ICG interview, FDLR, Brussels, June 2002.
101
22 February 1992, Ruhengeri, national debate, recording
of speech by Mr. Nshimyimana.
Dr. Jean Marie Vianny Higiro, FDLR member,
founding member of the MDR in 1991 and
former director of ORINFOR from 1993 to
April 1994. Dr. Higiro is a prominent moderate
Hutu intellectual who took a stand against the
genocidal ideology very early on. Prime
Minister Faustin Twagiramungu offered him
the post of Minister of Information in 1995. He
accepted but stated that he had not wanted to
return to Rwanda given the RPF’s lack of
respect for human rights. His presence lends
moral support to the movement.
ICG interview with Christophe Hakizabera, Brussels, June
2002.
103
ICG interview with members of the Igihango Alliance,
June 2002.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
conduct a large-scale military offensive against the
RPA. President Kabila merely provided minimal
logistic aid in order to contain the external threat and
prevent his own allies from turning into a threat
against his government.
Page 22
careful and has not allowed them to raise a sizeable
force.105
For the DCR, the logic behind their patronage of the
FDLR is twofold. First, it is a means of requesting
reciprocity in the peace process. The main FDLR
demand for an inter-Rwandan dialogue accurately
reflects the Rwandan demand, which was imposed
through the Lusaka accords, for an inter-Congolese
dialogue aimed at ousting Kabila from the
government and stripping him of his powers. It is
also likely that the Congolese government wanted to
“thank” the groups of armed Hutus for their support
in the war in DCR by lending a certain credibility
and visibility to their political demands and in so
doing, preparing their return to Rwanda.
However, the progress made in the peace process
with the signing of the Pretoria accord and the partial
withdrawal of Rwanda led the DRC to change its
policy. At the beginning of October 2002, Kinshasa
declared the FDLR to be persona non grata and
even arrested approximately ten members who were
attempting to cross back into the DCR through
Brazzaville104.
The other source of armed opposition to the Kigali
government is based in Kampala. RPA deserters are
trying to take advantage of the Rwandan-Ugandan
conflict in order to obtain assistance from Uganda
and to be able to organise an armed rebellion if need
be. For example, Kigali accuses Major Alphonse
Furuma, formerly an NRA officer before joining the
RPA, of wanting to start an armed rebellion from
Uganda. However, in Kampala, the rivalries between
English-speaking and French-speaking Rwandan
dissidents prevent the deserters from coming
together. Furuma attempted to unite them but his
former close ties with RPF leaders destroyed his
credibility with the genocide survivors and especially
the French-speaking survivors, who see him as a
Kagame “clone.” In fact, since he monopolises
access to the Ugandan government, Furuma is seen
as the major obstacle to forming a united opposition
in Kampala. Finally, some deserters are also
suspected of being double agents who report
information back to Kigali. Kampala is extremely
104
AFP, 9 October 2002.
105
ICG interview with RPA deserters, Kampala 2002.
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
C.
Page 23
ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES
FDLR/
hutu
RDR/
hutu
FRD/
hutu
CDA/
hutu
MPDD/
hutu
ARENA/
tutsi-hutu
Nation/
tutsi-hutu
ADR
UFDR
People‘s Congress
Schism within ARENA
ADRN IGIHANGO
1.
The moderate Hutu opposition restructures
itself (1998-2002)
The rapprochement between Seth Sendashonga’s
FRD and the RDR heirs of “Hutu power” had led to
the creation of the Union of Rwandan Democratic
Forces (UFDR) back in September 1998. However,
the genocidal image tied to the RDR prevented this
alliance from getting off the ground. Moreover, one
of the FRD’s preliminaries was unequivocal
recognition of the genocide by the DRC. This
position caused a fracture in the movement and the
hard-liners split off. Many of these hard-liners joined
the FDLR in 2000106.
The support base of the Democratic Rally for the
Return of Refugees (RDR) was also divided between
hard core and moderate “Hutu power” supporters.
The UFDR tried to merge these movements into a
legitimate, non-genocidal opposition to the RPF
regime and instil a deeply rooted movement among
Hutu refugees, who were still promoting genocidal
theories. These attempts resulted in a split within the
RDR and in-fighting that prevented a strong political
personality, namely Faustin Twagiramungu from
heading up the union.107 Since then, attempts to unify
the external opposition in order to reconcile the
conflicting differences among the various anti-RPF
political movements have increased.
On 31 December 2001, the African Democratic
Congress (CDA) and the Movement for Peace,
Democracy and Development (MPDD), two small
parties of exiles and independent politicians, formed
the ADR Isangano (Rwandan Democratic Alliance).
These two parties were fringe groups but their
alliance and the presence of strong personalities from
the FRD, the MDR and moderate parties (Rwandan
Socialist Party, PSR) added prominence to this
movement, thanks especially to the participation of
Sixberg Musangamfura (MDR) and Jean-Baptiste
Mberabahizi (former PSR who collaborated with the
RPF, member of the FRD with close ties to Seth
Sendashonga, and founding member of the CDA).
They filled in the void left by the FRD by positioning
themselves as a Hutu opposition party that was more
moderate than the UFDR. In addition, the ADR’s ties
with Tutsi RPA deserters increased its credibility.
The movement now portrays itself as political and
non-violent, but it also claims to have ties with Major
Furuma, who has been based in Kampala since
106
Such as the president of the FDLR, Dr. Ignance
Murwanashyaka.
107
ICG interview, June 2002.
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
2000.108 The ADR is seeking military support in
Uganda, but has yet to find it, owing in part to the
divisions between the francophones and anglophones
who reign in Kampala. Major Furuma himself is
isolated and does not have a real force. At most, he
has some 300 men – RPA deserters, Banyamulenge
soldiers and Hutu militias who have broken ranks
with the ALiR – whose only common ground is their
desire to take revenge on the RPF. Since Uganda
refuses to openly support a rebellion launched from
its territory, the ADR is contemplating activating this
force from North Kivu with Ugandan assistance.109
This option remains uncertain.
In addition, the birth of IGIHANGO (see below), a
vast alliance between the main unarmed opposition
parties in exile and the FDLR, has weakened the
ADR and the UFDR, relegating them to the back
burner. IGIHANGO is short-circuiting the ADR’s
relations with the RPA deserters, especially its
French-speaking members.110 Conscious of the fact
that IGIHANGO is gaining strength, the ADR and
the UFDR have subsequently entered into
negotiations with this movement and its lead
mediator, Valens Kajeguhakwa111. However, the
mediator’s withdrawal in July 2002 and the current
status quo seem to indicate that the attempts to form
alliances are at a standstill for the time being. In fact,
the main obstacle is the persistent refusal of some
groups to align themselves with the FDLR.
2.
IGIHANGO, A “Pact Sealed in Blood”
The FDLR’s inability to shake their image of a
“negative force” has led them to initiate a second
phase through political rapprochement with the
Tutsi-allegiance movements, in particular, ARENA
and Nation. To do so, they called upon Valens
Kajeguhakwa,112 a former RPF financier who has
severed ties with the regime. Kajeguhakwa agreed to
play the role of mediator and began to bring the
groups together. The approach phase lasted three
months and ended with the creation of the Alliance
for Democracy and National Reconciliation (ADRN)
108
ICG interview with ADR, Brussels, June 2002.
ICG interview, Kampala, May 2002.
110
ICG interview, Kampala, May 2002.
111
ICG interview with the UFDR and the ADR, Brussels,
June 2002.
112
Former RPF member of parliament and former president
of the BACAR, who has been exiled from Rwanda.
109
Page 24
- IGIHANGO, a “pact sealed in blood” in Bad
Honnef, Germany on 27 March 2002.113
The FDLR are the main beneficiaries of this alliance,
which gives them the political legitimacy they
sought. In particular, they are taking advantage of
their contacts with Tutsi exiles within the RPA and
plan to use them to infiltrate and destabilise the RPA.
ARENA initially held out a lot of hope, but it has
been weakened by internal rivalries and the
perception that it is just another Tutsi party – too
similar to the RPF. Some of its members feel that
ARENA has only given ceremonial positions to the
few Hutus among its ranks.114 In addition, it does not
have a military force. Aware that without a military
force, the Kigali regime will never be inclined to
negotiate, ARENA needs to find other ways to
pressure the government. Thus, the presence of
FDLR in the alliance with IGIHANGO gives
ARENA and NATION, the other Tutsi group, the
ability to apply military pressure and provides them
with political support among the Hutu population.
ARENA and NATION also counted on using the
FDLR to profit from Kinshasa’s financial and
material support. It was becoming urgent for these
two movements to find funds.115 However, this
choice of alliance also caused the departure of some
members, such as Alexandre Kimenyi, former RPF
representative to the United States, who dissociated
themselves from ARENA and formed a new party,
the People’s Congress.
The objectives of this Alliance are political and
military. The members realise that they will not be
able to inflict a military defeat on the RPA, but they
also know that harassing the RPA can push them to
commit errors, or more importantly, cause an internal
implosion due to political disagreements in its ranks.
They are betting on weakening support for the RPF
from the international community. They are even
expecting to receive financial and diplomatic support
from the international community (primarily France,
Belgium and the United States).116 They feel that only
international political and financial pressure can
113
See Bad Honnef Act, Charter of the Alliance for
Democracy and National Reconciliation.
114
ICG interview with ARENA, Brussels, June 2002.
115
ICG interview, Brussels, June 2002.
116
The Alliance asserts that the American government will
take them more seriously because of their political merger
and they are hoping to obtain funding from the U.S.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
bring Rwanda to the negotiating table. According to
their calculations, when this day comes, they will
have built up enough of a military force to make
them a credible negotiating partner.
3.
Political platform
All the aforementioned movements have officially
recognised the genocide. After a meeting in Brussels
in July 2002, the FDLR consented to the publication
of the following communiqué: “The IGIHANGO
Alliance unequivocally recognises the genocide of
the Tutsis and reiterates its categorical condemnation.
The Alliance clearly recognises and condemns the
crimes committed against the Hutus ....”117
Agreement on this joint communiqué was obtained
only after heated discussions and not without
difficulty. Of course, the ultimate test of sincerity of
the FDLR’s new position will be whether or not they
cooperate with the ICTR in arresting those who
perpetrated the genocide, and agree to Kinshasa
handing over perpetrators as well. Such is the price
this unnatural alliance will have to pay in order to
become credible.
Page 25
community. This discourse is a far cry from the calls
to kill launched by some of the parties between 1990
and 1994. The UFDR’s political platform,119 for
example, is extremely close to the RPF’s presidential
project. On the other hand, the IGIHANGO Alliance
and the ADR do not agree on the semi-presidential
system and are opting for a consensual or
concordance-based parliamentary system.120 The
goal for these two movements is to block Paul
Kagame’s road to re-election and prevent one man
from controlling all the power.
Finally, all the forces in exile are calling for an inter-
Rwandan dialogue arbitrated by the international
community.121 They feel that President Kagame will
not make any real overtures unless he is pressured
by his donors or unless there is stronger pressure
exerted on the RPA in Rwanda. This call for an
inter-Rwandan dialogue will become more and more
important if there is not any political opening in
Rwanda.
The three main movements, IGIHANGO, ADR and
UFDR, are proposing a consensus-based political
system. The ethnic mix of the main two movements
and the presence of moderate Hutus in the UFDR has
led to a discussion based on power sharing and a real
balance of power between the various political circles
of influence (Hutus, Tutsis, North, South, Tutsis in
Rwanda and the Burundian, Ugandan and Congolese
disasporas). All the players realise that a classic “one
person, one vote” model of democracy will give a
victory to the Hutus and consequently, will not end
the country’s perpetual conflicts. Unlike the
Rwandan government, the IGIHANGO Alliance is
not denying the ethnic problems and is seeking
institutional solutions such as a bicameral assembly
with equal representation or representation by quota
for the Senate. It is also demanding veto power for
cases in which a group would be threatened by a
bill.118
The opposition has also proposed a draft
constitution, which is basically similar to that of the
government. This draft shows that the antagonists
have mastered a sterile discourse that allows each
party to maintain its credibility with the international
117
118
ADRN press release, 23 July 2002.
ICG interview, Brussels, June 2002.
119
UFDR Political Platform, pg. 17
Note sur la démocratie de concordance, Jean Baptiste
Mberabahizi (personal contribution); The Guidelines of
Consensus-Based Democracy proposed by the Igihango
Alliance.
121
ICG interview with the ADRN, ADR and UFDR,
Brussels, June 2002.
120
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
V.
CONCLUSION
In this pre-elections year, President Kagame has one
chance to show himself to be a truly conciliatory
president and to reverse the authoritarian trend of the
government during this exceptional period that has
lasted since 1994. The progress made in the peace
process in the DRC will lead to the return of
thousands of Hutu soldiers through the DDRR
process – both those who are integrated into the RPA
and FDLR soldiers. At the same time Hutu prisoners
will be released and the gacaca trials conducted. The
combination of these various events is potentially
dangerous unless it is accompanied by freer debate,
and not used as an excuse to intensify the vicious
circle of repression inside Rwanda. This only causes
the frustrations and the opposition to carry more
weight. The Rwandan government must assume its
responsibilities, accept criticism and prevent these
frustrations from festering by providing a forum for
expression for the entire population.
A neutral institution, such as an ombudsman’s
office, with political, administrative and financial
independence from the government should be able to
establish fair rules for political competition and
define the limits on freedom of speech and
association in order to keep these freedoms from
being criminalised. The Rwandan government must
give society the opportunity to assume its own
responsibilities vis-à-vis the genocide and to lay its
own foundations for reconciliation, rather than
forcefully imposing the terms of reconciliation on
society. The government should also extend its hand
to the opposition in exile by offering to allow it to
participate in a great national debate on the future of
the country.
The drafting of a new constitution and the pre-
electoral period are opportunities for the RPF to join
together and engage in this open, national debate on
the future of the country. The law on political
parties, the code of conduct, the party forum and the
draft constitution must be discussed and approved by
the movements in exile. In exchange, these
movements must reject armed struggle, participate in
the arrest of persons wanted by the ICTR, dismantle
their military units, and clearly condemn the
genocide and genocidal ideology. If the RPF
continues to be both the judge and the jury in
political life, the wall between the leaders and those
they govern will only loom larger, accentuating the
lack of understanding and the risk of violence.
Page 26
The upcoming year will be crucial for the credibility
of the constitutional reform, as well as the credibility
of the dates set for elections and the post-transition
institutions. The international community cannot
keep silent and be complicit in the Rwandan
government’s drift towards authoritarianism. It
cannot finance elections that do not offer any
political guarantees for a minimum of fairness
between the opposing forces, knowing that
sanctioning the status quo will not provide the space
needed for the desired reconciliation. Today, eight
months before the end of the transition period, the
Rwandan government must resign itself to an
obligatory political liberalisation.
The international community must also do
everything in its power to guarantee progress in the
peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
and in particular, the DDRR program for Rwandan
Hutu soldiers. Political life in Rwanda cannot be
normalised unless there is security in Eastern Congo.
Nairobi/Brussels, 13 November 2002
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Page 27
APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE OF A REVISIONIST EDITORIAL PUBLISHED BY THE NEWSPAPER LE
PARTISAN (N°50, DECEMBER 2000)
Translation from Kinyarwanda by Grands lacs Hebdo (Great Lakes Weekly):
“Mea culpa for you who have governed the country like a dictator for 21 years and ...opposed the return
of refugees...Mea Culpa, as this brought an armed return to destroy the goods and hearts of Rwandans...
Mea culpa for you who went to war believing that you would save the inhabitants but caused the death of
over a million inside, three million in Congo, the detention of over 100,000 peasants and intellectuals
awaiting the Gacaca...let it be known that the Gacaca only concerns crimes committed between 1990 and
1994, purposely forgetting that Rwandans have been killed throughout the ages even after the genocide.
Mea culpa for you who after taking power basked in the celebrations and rested on your laurels while
other conflicts were taking place between parties inside and outside the country. Mea culpa for you who
during the genocide massacred innocent people, their only crime being their ethnic group, on the pretext
of keeping you in power. Mea culpa for you who shot at refugees in Kibeho and Mahoko, on whom you
took revenge out of anger because your own had just been decimated, who took innocent citizens and
threw them in open graves, or had them thrown in...Mea culpa for you who multiplied these graves
instead of replacing them by building more schools for the children of survivors on both sides. Mea culpa
for you, on your knees, who appropriated the goods of citizens and refused to hand them back on the
pretext that they belonged to the Interahamwe, while those who did not even kill a fly find themselves
homeless and look on resignedly at their parents’ property. Mea culpa for you who are the root of so
much trauma caused by unemployment despite their qualifications, of people who must resort to exile in
order to flee famine; for you who give loans to build buildings but give nothing to fight against poverty.
Mea culpa for you who forbid those who return and choose to progress in a democracy based on a multi-
party system...”
Two points in this editorial reveal the irresponsibility of the press:
! It accuses the RPF of considerable responsibility for the genocide. This theory is shared by several
 exiled Hutu opposition leaders. This is not a genocide denial argument in itself, but rather a
revisionist theory, that is, a reinterpretation of the genocide122.
! It only touches very superficially on the genocide in its rapid presentation of the country’s history.
   This, compared to accusations made against the RPF, tends to deny the genocide. The speech can
  therefore be interpreted as genocide denial. It is one thing for the journalist to argue that the
 responsibilities and acts of the RPF have not been recognised, but quite another to negate the
genocide in order to give weight to his arguments, which is clearly unacceptable.
122
See genocide denial and revisionism taking root in 3.D.
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Page 28
APPENDIX B
LIST OF RPF OPPONENTS WHO HAVE GONE INTO EXILE SINCE 1995
The explanation for the departure of the persons below is subject to different interpretations from the
government and the persons themselves. However, their number and the posts they held are an indication
of the current tensions.
Théoneste Lizinde RPF headquarters and Hutu deputy
Eugène Ndahayo MDR/ Hutu
Jean de Dieu Tulikimana MDR/Hutu
Sixbert Musangamfura MDR/ Hutu (intelligence services at the office of the
                    Prime Minister)
J Baptiste Mkuriyngoma MININFOR
Christophe Hakizabera RPF/ Hutu
François Xavier Nsanzuwera Kigali Prosecutor/ Hutu
1996 Jean Baptiste Mberabahazi PSR/FRD/ Hutu
1998 Iyakaremye Jean Bosco CA Ibuka
1999 Bonaventure Ubalijoro MDR President
Major Kwikiriza APR deserter
King’s Army, 200 young people from Nyamirambo Believed to belong to the King’s Army
Joseph Sebarenzi Kabuye* President of the Assembly
Dr Josué Kayijaho* V. Pres. of IBUKA/ Tutsi
Anastase Murumba Secretary General of IBUKA
Déo Mushayidi Director of Maison Presse/ Tutsi
Jason Muhayimana* Imboni Journalist/ Tutsi
Jean -Claude Nkubito AFP Journalist/ Tutsi
Deus Kagiraneza RPA soldier, ex-deputy/ Tutsi
Pierre Célestin Rwigyema Prime Minister MDR/Hutu
Valens Kajeguhakwa Former RPF deputy/ Tutsi
J Bosco Rutagengwa Director of Engen, founding president Ibuka/ Tutsi
2000
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Gérard Karangwa Assiel Kabera* Former MDR deputy/ Tutsi
Boniface Rutayisire Printer
Pierre Byakunda Priest in Mubuga ( Kibuye)
Osée Niyibizi* Secretary General of the Survivors’ Fund
Edouard Kayihura* Kigali deputy public prosecutor (Kibuye)
Gérard Ntashamaje Major in the RPA
Dr Narcisse Gakuba CA Ibuka/ PL
Sisi Evariste Member of Ibuka/ PL deputy
Chantal Kayitesi Coordinator of Avega
Major Furuma RPA deserter
Alexis Ruzindana RPA Major/ deserter
Rwaka Gakwaya Minister of the Interior and Security
Espérance Uwambyeyi Coordinator of Avega
John Mugabi Newsline Journalist
Yvonne Uwanyirigira Director of Maison de la Presse
Sylvie Kabagwira Avega (genocide widow)
Mutake Tarcisse
2002
Advisor to President Bizimungu /Tutsi
Jean Mbanda
2001
Customs Director /Tutsi
Former CA Ibuka
*Born in Kibuye.
Page 29
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Page 30
APPENDIX C
THE CASE OF THE PDR UBUYANJA
Pasteur Bizimungu stepped down as President of the
Republic in March 2002. On 30 May 2001, when he
was preparing to announce the formation of a
political party – the Party for Democracy and
Regeneration, PDR “Ubuyanja”, he was sequestered
in his home. In June 2001, he was arrested, placed
under house arrest and stripped of his privileges as
former president. The courts accused him of having
violated the law on political parties by forming the
PDR123. The Rwandan government banned the PDR
in June 2001 even though there was no law
prohibiting the formation of a new party. A series of
arrests of alleged members ensued and they were
charged with advocating ethnic hatred. An interview
with Bizimungu in July 2001 by Jeune Afrique
magazine upped the tensions a notch. His words were
interpreted as advocating divisionism and denial of
the genocide. In reality, his words were more a
warning concerning the deteriorating situation than a
call to return to the “Hutu power” ideas.
“We are persuaded that if things continue, the Hutus
will prepare for war and in fifteen or twenty years,
they will have driven out the Tutsis, with the
conceivable consequences that would entail.
Mechanisms need to be set up so that each
community can truly have a hand in the government,
until we have forged a national identity that
transcends Hutu/Tutsi divisions. (...) Rwanda is not a
constitutional state and it has enormous problems.
The inequalities in the promotion system stir up much
discontent. If the situation does not change, the only
possible outcome is violence. The war of 1990 is not
over.124”
On 8 August 2001, Pasteur Bizimungu was assaulted
in the Remera neighbourhood. On 16 August,
Charles Ntakirutinka, the secretary general of the
party, was attacked while driving in a car. On 17
August, RPA soldiers took Pasteur Bizimungu to an
undisclosed location. Later on in the day, the same
happened to Charles Ntakirutinka. Both were
released later that night after their homes had been
searched and all documents pertaining to the PDR
had been confiscated. On 26 December 2001, one of
the founders of the party, Gratien Munyarubuga, was
killed in Kigali by unknown assailants125. The crime
became political and the opposition likened it to a
warning to party members. On 10 December 2001,
Catherine Mujawamaliya, PDR secretary, was
arrested and imprisoned. She was not released until
the beginning of February. She upset the government
by accusing the RPA of having assassinated her
family in 1994 in Kigali.126
On 7 April 2002, the campaign against the PDR
resumed. President Kagame set the tone in his speech
during the 8th commemoration of the genocide. He
stated, “Although they hold high political offices in
this country, they are still advocating division among
the Rwandans and spend their time looking for
support at the Embassies”, followed by “the day our
patience runs out, these milieus will no longer be of
any use to them.”127 The message was a barely veiled
threat. On 19 April 2002, Pasteur Bizimungu and
Charles Ntakirutinka were taken into custody. The
opposition saw the link between the two events and
accused the Rwandan government of persecuting the
opposition solely because it did not wish to conform
to RPF ideology. The indictments and their veracity
should therefore be examined.
Tony Kuramba, police spokesperson stated, “We
received information that these two men were
continuing the activities of their political party which
has been banned by the authorities. We therefore
proceeded to search their homes on Friday morning
(...) during these searches, we found documents
calling for civil disobedience and the division of the
Rwandans, and undermining national security.”128
The arrests of the two leaders were topped off by a
wave of arrests in the provinces of Gisenyi and
Kigali. The grounds for the accusations were the
same – “national security offences by means of secret
meetings of the PDR, among other things.” In total,
125
HRW press release, 9 January 2002.
Human rights report “Fact-finding mission to Rwanda,”
30 May 2002.
127
Amani, no. 35-36, April-May 2002 “Bizimungu Takes
the Stand”, pg. 17.
128
AFP, 20 April 2002.
126
123
Human rights report “Fact-finding mission to Rwanda”,
30 May 2002.
124
Jeune Afrique, No. 2112 of 3-9 July 2001.
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
25 people were arrested, taken to the police station
and then to the central prisons. LIPRODHOR was
concerned about the lawfulness of the procedures.
“For those whom the prosecutor has decided to
request detention pending trial, most are going before
the council judge, sometimes hastily, without the
assistance of a lawyer. Even more worrisome is the
fact that the detention is upheld by a judge despite the
lack of compliance with the rules of procedure,
especially the rules governing the maximum time for
police custody.”129 This hunt for alleged members of
the PDR installed a climate of fear. The arrests of
party leaders and the attempts to intimidate reveal the
outline of a repressive military that does not tolerate
any dissidence.
Page 31
must stop.133” It is true that behind his public
discourse, the President privately criticised the
exclusion of Hutus from the government, in a very
demagogical and simplistic way. However, the real
problem lies in the issue of electoral competition.
The PDR is recruiting as many Hutus as Tutsis and
its leader, who served the RPF leaders for years, is
also capable of building an extended support base
among Hutus. Thus, he would have been a serious
challenger running against Paul Kagame in the
upcoming presidential elections.
The police refute the idea that the arrests were
directed from the president’s office, and feel that the
evidence against the accused persons is consistent.
The charges against them are as follows130:
! The documents seized at their homes prove that
 the PDR was still active, despite the official ban
on the party. Correspondence with their
supporters abroad discussed the handling of
weapons, which is a threat to State security.
However, the evidence has not been disclosed
and the accused say that all the documents that
do not appear in the [police] report that they
signed have been doctored131.
! Bizimungu is charged for his interview with
 Jeune Afrique, which was deemed to be
divisionist, for illegal possession of a firearm,
and 16,000 dollars. Bizimungu retorts that
there is no law prohibiting the possession of a
sum of money in one’s home and that the
 firearm was not revoked by police when he
was stripped of his privileges as former head
of State.132
Bizimungu asserts that his party “encourages the
participation of all Rwandans in all institutions of
the country (...) that at no time did they ever say
that such and such a group should be excluded,
emphasising the fact that exclusion has been
Rwanda’s plague and that if this logic continues,
the same policy would produce the same effect, and
consequently, the fight between Tustis and Hutus
129
Liprodhor press release, June 2002.
Amani, no. 35-36, April-May 2002, “Bizimungu Takes
the Stand”, pg. 16
131
Ibid.
132
Ibid.
130
133
Amani, no. 35-36, April-May 2002, “Bizimungu Takes
the Stand”, pg. 17
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Page 32
APPENDIX D
THE FIVE PHASES OF THE RWANDAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONSULTATION
Phase one:
Training, information, awareness raising, communication and consultation (July
2001 – July 2002)
The members of the Commission were trained and then they collected the maximum amount of data on
the various examples of constitutions throughout the world. Out of this work was born a preliminary
“Reference Document for General Information on the Constitution.” Distributed to the people in the form
of a small book also called a “training module,” this booklet lays out a table of all the constitution models
in existence. From July 2001 to December 2001, 10,000 representatives of the local authorities134 were
introduced to constitutional concepts. They then went out to train the people in the various districts. Each
commissioner is assigned to a province in order to ensure the smooth conduct of the awareness campaign.
The commissioners also met with representatives of civil society. The grassroots community leaders
continued the popular awareness campaign in the sectors and cells. The Commission seemed unanimous
on the results of this stage: “The people are pleased with the participatory and inclusive approach the
Commission used.”
The popular consultation (CP) that followed was based on the use of two tools: questionnaires and
interview guides. The questionnaire, which is multiple choice, was distributed to the population starting in
January 2002. It discusses all the themes that come up during the drafting of a constitution (from the type
of regime to citizens’ rights) and the reader has the opportunity to indicate all of his/her choices. However,
the questionnaire is a bit too long and too specific or too complete to be addressed to the entire Rwandan
population. Rather, it seems to have been written for the educated population. Given its limited
distribution (75,000 for less than 1 per cent of the population), and the number of questionnaires that the
Commission had hoped to gather (50,000), it is clear that the questionnaire was not designed to gather
proposals from the peasant populations.
The interview guide was designed to gather proposals from all Rwandans through meetings of the people.
It is structured according to the themes to be discussed. The commissioner is supposed to lead the
discussion as a “neutral facilitator” so as to let the people react and lead the discussion. The Commission
records the ideas advanced during these meetings on the interview guide. Later, during the writing phase,
all these ideas will be taken into account.
Phase Two:
Collection and Analysis, Data Processing and Writing the First Draft (August –
November 2002):
The data will be processed by members of the Commission working with a wide-ranging panel of experts.
Given that it will be impossible to process all the data, only 7 per cent of the estimated 50,000 returned
questionnaires will be analysed. This sampling is supposed to represent the opinions of districts and
groups. A summary will be written from the interview guides, bringing together the 106 districts, in 12
province reports. Based on this data, a national report on all the consultations will be written by the end of
August 2002. The draft will be based on this report and will be presented to a sampling of consulted
groups so that they may validate it before it is submitted to the ANT and to the government. The validation
meetings will be held in all districts and on the national level. The goal is to present the proposed main
points and the points to be clarified in September/October 2002. Following this consultation, a draft will
be written and confirmation will follow in October/November 2002.
134
The local authorities: the members of the executive committee of all districts and towns (5 members x 106 districts and
towns), and the members of the political-administrative committee for all the sectors. This committee is made up of a sector
coordinator, a committee secretary, a security officer and an information officer, and finally, an education and training
officer in the Commune Development Committee (CDC) from each sector and the elected council member from each sector.
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Page 33
Phase Three: Validation of the Draft Constitution by the transition National Assembly, and
Finalisation of the Draft Constitution (November 2002 – April 2003)
Phase Four:
Referendum on the Draft Constitution (April 2003)
The referendum will be the final stage in this process of popular participation. It will be held in April 2003
if the calendar is followed. The three months leading up to the referendum will be reserved for an
informational campaign. This campaign will be organised by either the Constitutional Commission or the
Electoral Commission. Obviously, there will be organisational and financial problems. These problems
have not yet been solved. Most likely, Rwanda will need to call upon its donors. The donors will need to
set up an independent verification commission.
Phase Five:
Preparation of the Draft Legislation Governing the Final Period of the Transition
(December 2002 – June 2003)
All the groups and institutions concerned by the final period in the transition government will be consulted
in order to identify laws, and to then write a draft of this legislation.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Page 34
APPENDIX E
POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS OF THE MAIN RWANDAN LEADERS
I. High-ranking State Leaders
Name
Position
Political
Affiliation
Paul Kagame President RPF
Vincent Biruta President of ANT PSD
Bernard Makuza Prime Minister MDR
Siméon Rwagasore President of the Supreme RPF
                  Court
Désiré Nyandwi Minister RPF
Odette Nyiramirimo Secretary of State PL
Protais Musoni Secretary General RPF
Jean de Dieu Ntiruhungwa Minister MDR
Zac Nsenga Secretary General RPF
André Bumaya Minister PDI
Joseph Mutaboba Secretary General RPF
Donald Kaberuka Minister RPF
Célestin Kabanda Secretary of State MDR
Ben Karenzi Secretary General RPF
Alexandre Lyambabaje Minister PSD
Agnès Kayigire Secretary General RPF
Laurent Nkusi Minister PL
Drocella Mugorewera Secretary of State PDC
Patricie Hajabakiga Secretary General RPF
Ephraim Kabayija Minister RPF
Aaron Makuba Secretary of State PSD
Habamenshi C. Secretary General PSD
II. Ministries
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
Regional Administration and Social
Affairs
Internal Security
Foreign Affairs
Finance and Economy
Trade, Industry and Tourism
Land, Relocation and Environment
Agriculture
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
2.8
Energy
Jean de Dieu Mucyo Minister RPF
Secretary General MDR
Ezechias Rwabuhihi Minister RPF
RPF
Romain Murenzi Minister RPF
Secretary of State RPF
Secretary of State PSD
Secretary General RPF
Emmanuel Habyalimana Minister Secretary General RPF
Sylvie Kayitesi Zainabo Minister RPF
Secretary General RPF
Silas Kanamugire Minister Secretary General RPF
Marcel Bahunde Minister RPF
Emmanuel Nsanzumuganwa
2.16
Transportation and Communication
RPF
Ephrem Rutaboba
2.15
Work and Public Services
Secretary General Fidèle R.
2.14
RPF
Col. Caesar Kayizari
Defence
Minister Eugène Munyakayanza
2.13
François Ngarambe J. Damascène
                    Ntawukulilyayo
Education
MDR
Emmanuel Mudidi
2.12
Health
Secretary General Secretary General
2.11
Justice
RPF
Edda Mukabagwiza
2.10
Minister Marie Agnès Mukazibera
Youth, Sport and Culture
Angelina Muganza Marie Claire Mukasine
2.9
Gender and Women
Page 35
Secretary General RPF
III. Members of Parliament
3.1 RPF Total: 13
3.2 RPA Total: 6
3.3 PL Total: 13
3.4 PSD Total: 13
3.5 MDR Total: 13
3.6 PDC Total: 6
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
3.7 PDI Total: 2
3.8 PSR
Page 36
Total: 2
3.9 UDPR Total: 2
3.10 Youth Total: 2
3. 11 Women Total: 2
IV. Provincial Leaders
1. Town Hall, Kigali town Théoneste Mutsindashyaka RPF
2. Rural Kigali Aloysia Inyumba RPF
3. Gitarama Fulgence Nsengiyumva RPF
4. Butare Pierre Karemera PSD
5. Gikongoro Augustin Mutijima RPF
6. Cyangugu Elisée Bisengimana RPF
7. Kibuye Déo Nkusi RPF
8. Gisenyi Fidèle Mitsindo RPF
9. Ruhengeri Boniface Rucagu RPF
10. Byumba Appolinaire Rugemintwaza RPF
11. Umutara Ntabana Innocent RPF
12. Kibungo James Kimonyo RPF
V. Diplomatic Missions
1. Washington RPF
2. New York MDR
3. London RPF
4. Paris RPF
5. Brussels RPF
6. Berlin RPF
7. Geneva RPF
8. Beijing MDR
9. India RPF
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Page 37
10. Addis Ababa RPF
11. South Africa RPF
12. Uganda RPF
13. Tanzania RPF
14. Kenya RPF
15. Burundi RPF
VI. Security Services
1. Chief of Staff James Kabarebe RPF
2. Chief Inspector of Police Frank Mugambage RPF
3. Secretary General of Security Nyamwasa Kayumba RPF
4. First Secretary of Police Ephrem Rurangwa RPF
5. Second Secretary Police Gacinya RPF
6. Internal Security Jean Pierre Bizimana MDR
7. External Intelligence Patrick Karegeya RPF
8. Military Intelligence Jack Nziza RPF
9. Immigration and Emigration Richard Masozera RPF
VII. Commissions and Other State Institutions
1. President of the Constitutional Tito Rutaremara RPF
   Commission
2. Executive Secretary of the Constitutional Jean Mutsinzi RPF
   Commission
3. President of the Electoral Commission Protais Musoni RPF
4. Executive Secretary of the Electoral Christophe Bazivamo RPF
   Commission
5. President of the Commission for Unity Jean Baptiste Habyarimana PSD
   and Reconciliation
6. Executive Secretary of the Commission Fatuma Ndangiza RPF
   for Unity and Reconciliation
7. President of the Human Rights Ndoba Gasana RPF
   Commission
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
9.
National Office of Government
Contracting Services
Page 38
David Mukwali RPF
IX. Banks
1. National Bank of Rwanda François Kanimba MDR
2. Commercial Bank John Rutayisire RPF
4. Bank for Rwandan Development Edith Gasana RPF
7. BCDI Alfred Kalisa RPF
X. Higher Education Establishments
1. National University of Rwanda Emile Rwamasirabo RPF
2. KIST Silas Rwakabamba RPF
XI. State-run Companies and Joint Ventures
1. Electrogaz Sam Nkusi RPF
5. CHR Hope Murerwa RPF
6. Rwandex Antoine Mugesera RPF
8. RRA James Musoni RPF
10. ISAR Mugunga Muhinda RPF
13. ONAPO Ruzibuka John RPF
14. RAMA Dr. Ndushabandi RPF
15. OCIR-Thé I. Kayitare RPF
16. SONARWA Marie Mukantabana RPF
17. Onatracom I. Gatwabuyenge MDR
18. OCIR-café Anastase Nzirasanaho PSD
20. FARG Janvier Kanyamashuri RPF
21. ORINFOR Joseph Bideli RPF
23. PNLM Dr Rwagacondo RPF
24. RIPA Bonaventure Niyibizi RPF
28. CAPMER Murenzi PSD
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ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
29.
XII.
Imprisco
Page 39
Murangira RPF
Justice
1. Chief Prosecutor Gerald Gahima RPF
2. Court of Cassation Hodari RPF
4. Constitutional Court Ndorimana RPF
5. Courts and Tribunals Tharcisse Karugarama RPF
7. National Audit Office Mukandamage MDR
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Page 40
APPENDIX F
GLOSSARY
ADRN IGIHANGO: Alliance for Democracy
and National Reconciliation,
opposition party in exile.
ALiR:
Army for the Liberation of Rwanda,
Rwandan Hutu rebels including ex-
FAR and Interahamwe.
AMI: Alliance for National Regeneration,
    opposition party in exile.
Resistance Forces for Democracy,
opposition party in exile.
Collective of associations of
genocide survivors.
LDGL: League of People’s rights in the
       Great Lakes region. Human rights
      association.
League for the promotion and
defence of human rights. Human
rights association.
MDR: Democratic Republican Movement,
    party member of the government
   coalition.
Transition National Assembly.
ARENA: FRD: Modest and Innocent Association,
           Rwandan association in Butare.
ANT: Rwandan Patriotic Front, President
    Kagame’s party.
Liprodhor:
Rwandan Democratic Alliance,
opposition party in exile.
RPF: Ibuka:
ADR:
ARI: Rwandan Information Agency, press
    agency.
CDA: African Democratic Congress,
    opposition party in exile.
MINADEF: National Defence Ministry.
MINIFIN: Ministry of Finance.
Congrès du Peuple: MPDD: Movement for Peace, Democracy and
 Movement created from the Development, opposition party in
 ARENA split, opposition party in exile.
 exile.
CDR: Coalition for the Defence of the MRND: National Revolutionary Movement
     Republic, extremist Hutu party. for Development. Party of President
                                    Habyarimana.
CJC: Legal and Constitutional NATION: Monarchist Movement, opposition
     Commission. party in exile.
Circle of Progressive Republicans, NURC: National Commission for
Hutu extremist group. Reconciliation and Unity.
ONAJER: National Organisation of Rwandan
       Youth.
CRP:
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo.
DMI: Directorate of Military Intelligence,
    Rwandan military intelligence
   service.
ORINFOR: Rwandan Information Office.
FAR: Rwandan Armed Forces, former PDC: Christian Democrat Party. Member
     Rwandan national army. of the government coalition.
FDLR: Democratic Forces for the Liberation PDR: Party for Democracy and
      of Rwanda, a political-military Regeneration. Party of President
      opposition movement in exile.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
RPA: Rwandan Patriotic Army. Armed
    wing of the RPF, the Rwandan
   national army.
Liberal Party, member of government TPIR: International Criminal Tribunal for
coalition. Rwanda.
Social Democrat Party, member of UFDR: Union of Rwandan Democratic
government coalition. Forces, opposition party in exile.
Pasteur Bizimungu, currently a
political prisoner.
PL:
PSD:
Page 41
PSR: Rwandan Socialist Party, member of
    government coalition.
RDR: Democratic Rally for the Return of
    Refugees. Opposition party in exile.
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Page 42
APPENDIX G
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogotá,
independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, Islamabad, Jakarta, Nairobi, Osh, Pristina, Sarajevo,
with over 80 staff members on five continents, Sierra Leone and Skopje) with analysts working in
working through field-based analysis and high-level nearly 30 crisis-affected countries and territories
advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. across four continents.
ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. In Africa, those countries include Burundi, Rwanda,
  Teams of political analysts are located within or the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone-
  close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; in
  recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information Asia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
  and assessments from the field, ICG produces Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir; in
  regular analytical reports containing practical Europe, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia,
  recommendations targeted at key international Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the
  decision-takers. whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in
                  Latin America, Colombia.
ICG’s reports and briefing papers are distributed
widely by email and printed copy to officials in
foreign ministries and international organisations
and made generally available at the same time via
the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org.
ICG works closely with governments and those
who influence them, including the media, to
highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support
for its policy prescriptions.
The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures
from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and
the media – is directly involved in helping to bring
ICG reports and recommendations to the attention
of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is
chaired by former Finnish President Martti
Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive
since January 2000 has been former Australian
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.
ICG’s international headquarters are in Brussels,
with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New
York and Paris and a media liaison office in
London. The organisation currently operates eleven
ICG raises funds from governments, charitable
foundations, companies and individual donors. The
following governments currently provide funding:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the
Republic of China (Taiwan), Turkey, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
Foundation and private sector donors include The
Atlantic Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of
New York, Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation,
The Henry Luce Foundation, Inc., John D. &
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The John
Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation,
Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, The
Ruben & Elisabeth Rausing Trust, the Sasakawa
Peace Foundation and the United States Institute of
Peace.
November 2002
Further information about ICG can be obtained from our website: www.crisisweb.org
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Page 43
APPENDIX H
ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS∗
AFRICA
ALGERIA∗∗
The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20
October 2000 (also available in French)
The Civil Concord: A Peace Initiative Wasted, Africa Report
N°31, 9 July 2001 (also available in French)
Algeria’s Economy: A Vicious Circle of Oil and Violence,
Africa Report N°36, 26 October 2001 (also available in French)
BURUNDI
The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the
Peace Process in Burundi, Africa Report N°21, 18 April 2000
(also available in French)
Unblocking Burundi’s Peace Process: Political Parties,
Political Prisoners, and Freedom of the Press, Africa Briefing,
22 June 2000
Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom of
the Press and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N°23, 12 July
2000 (also available in French)
Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, Africa
Briefing, 27 August 2000
Burundi: Neither War, nor Peace, Africa Report N°25, 1
December 2000 (also available in French)
Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a New
Negotiating Framework, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001
(also available in French)
Burundi: 100 Days to put the Peace Process back on Track,
Africa Report N°33, 14 August 2001 (also available in French)
Burundi: After Six Months of Transition: Continuing the War
or Winning the Peace, Africa Report N°46, 24 May 2002
(also available in French)
The Burundi Rebellion and the Ceasefire Negotiations, Africa
Briefing, 6 August 2002
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, Africa
Report N°26, 20 December 2000 (also available in French)
From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,
Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001
Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention,
Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Political Negotiation or Game
of Bluff? Africa Report N°37, 16 November 2001 (also
available in French)
∗
Released since January 2000.
The Algeria project was transferred to the Middle
East Program in January 2002.
∗∗
Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR to
Prevent Further War, Africa Report N°38, 14 December 2001
Storm Clouds Over Sun City: The Urgent Need To Recast
The Congolese Peace Process, Africa Report N°38, 14 May
2002 (also available in French)
RWANDA
Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies? Africa Report
N°15, 4 May 2000
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed,
Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001 (also available in French)
“Consensual Democracy” in Post Genocide Rwanda:
Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections, Africa Report
N°34, 9 October 2001
Rwanda/Uganda: a Dangerous War of Nerves, Africa
Briefing, 21 December 2001
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The
Countdown, Africa Report N°50, 1 August 2002 (also available
in French)
Rwanda At The End of the Transition: A Necessary Political
Liberalisation, Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002 (also
available in French)
SOMALIA
Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, Africa
Report N°45, 23 May 2002
SUDAN
God, Oil & Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan,
Africa Report N°39, 28 January 2002
Capturing the Moment: Sudan's Peace Process in the
Balance, Africa Report N°42, 3 April 2002
Dialogue or Destruction? Organising for Peace as the War in
Sudan Escalates, Africa Report N°48, 27 June 2002
Sudan’s Best Chance For Peace: How Not To Lose It, Africa
Report N°51, 17 September 2002
WEST AFRICA
Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy,
Africa Report N°28, 11 April 2001
Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, Africa Report N°35, 24
October 2001
Sierra Leone: Ripe For Elections? Africa Briefing, 19
December 2001
Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability, Africa Report
N°43, 24 April 2002
Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics as Usual? Africa Report
N°49, 12 July 2002
Liberia: Unravelling, Africa Briefing, 19 August 2002
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July
2000
Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Briefing,
25 September 2000
Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a way Forward, Africa Report
N°32, 13 July 2001
Zimbabwe: Time for International Action, Africa Briefing, 12
October 2001
Zimbabwe’s Election: The Stakes for Southern Africa, Africa
Briefing, 11 January 2002
All Bark and No Bite: The International Response to
Zimbabwe’s Crisis, Africa Report N°40, 25 January 2002
Zimbabwe at the Crossroads: Transition or Conflict? Africa
Report N°41, 22 March 2002
Zimbabwe: What Next? Africa Report N° 47, 14 June 2002
Zimbabwe: The Politics of National Liberation and
International Division, Africa Report N°52, 17 October 2002
ASIA
CAMBODIA
Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8,
11 August 2000
CENTRAL ASIA
Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia Report
N°7, 7 August 2000 (also available in Russian)
Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences,
Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000
Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report
N°14, 1 March 2001 (also available in Russian)
Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty
and Social Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001 (also
available in Russian)
Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security Map, Asia
Report N°20, 4 July 2001 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan at Ten – Repression and Instability, Asia Report
N°21, 21 August 2001 (also available in Russian)
Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the “Island of Democracy”,
Asia Report N°22, 28 August 2001 (also available in Russian)
Central Asian Perspectives on the 11 September and the
Afghan Crisis, Central Asia Briefing, 28 September 2001
(also available in French and Russian)
Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, Asia Report N°25, 26
November 2001 (also available in Russian)
Afghanistan and Central Asia: Priorities for Reconstruction
and Development, Asia Report N°26, 27 November 2001
(also available in Russian)
Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace, Asia Report N°30, 24
December 2001 (also available in Russian)
The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the
Afghanistan Campaign, Central Asia Briefing, 30 January 2002
(also available in Russian)
Page 44
Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, Asia
Report N°33, 4 April 2002 (also available in Russian)
Central Asia: Water and Conflict, Asia Report N°34, 30 May
2002
Kyrgyzstan’s Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy, Asia Report
N°37, 20 August 2002 (also available in Russian)
The OSCE in Central Asia: A New Strategy, Asia Report
N°38, 11 September 2002
INDONESIA
Indonesia’s Crisis: Chronic but not Acute, Asia Report N°6,
31 May 2000
Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: The Issues, Indonesia Briefing,
19 July 2000
Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia Report
N°9, 5 September 2000 (also available in Indonesian)
Aceh: Escalating Tension, Indonesia Briefing, 7 December 2000
Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, Asia
Report N°10, 19 December 2000
Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross Human
Rights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001
Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20
February 2001 (also available in Indonesian)
Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February
2001
Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia,
Asia Report N°15, 13 March 2001
Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, Indonesia
Briefing, 21 May 2001
Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, Asia
Report N°17, 12 June 2001 (also available in Indonesian)
Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? Asia Report N°18,
27 June 2001
Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,
Asia Report N°19, 27 June 2001 (also available in Indonesian)
Indonesian-U.S. Military Ties, Indonesia Briefing, 18 July 2001
The Megawati Presidency, Indonesia Briefing, 10 September
2001
Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya, Asia Report
N°23, 20 September 2001
Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, Indonesia Briefing,
10 October 2001
Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform, Asia Report N°24,
11 October 2001
Indonesia: Natural Resources and Law Enforcement, Asia
Report N°29, 20 December 2001 (also available in Indonesian)
Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku, Asia Report
N°31, 8 February 2002
Aceh: Slim Chance for Peace, Indonesia Briefing, 27 March 2002
Indonesia: The Implications of the Timor Trials, Indonesia
Briefing, 8 May 2002
Resuming U.S.-Indonesia Military Ties, Indonesia Briefing,
21 May 2002
Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the “Ngruki
Network” in Indonesia, Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002
Ces rapports sont disponibles sur le site internet de l’ICG, www.crisisweb.org
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Indonesia: Resources And Conflict In Papua, Asia Report
N°39, 13 September 2002
Tensions on Flores: Local Symptoms of National Problems,
Indonesia Briefing, 10 October 2002
Impact of the Bali Bombings, Indonesia Briefing, 24 October
2002
MYANMAR
Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime? Asia
Report N°11, 21 December 2000
Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society, Asia Report N°27, 6
December 2001
Myanmar: The Military Regime’s View of the World, Asia
Report N°28, 7 December 2001
Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid, Asia Report
N°32, 2 April 2002
Myanmar: The HIV/AIDS Crisis, Myanmar Briefing, 2 April
2002
Myanmar: The Future of the Armed Forces, Asia Briefing, 27
September 2002
AFGHANISTAN/SOUTH ASIA
Afghanistan and Central Asia: Priorities for Reconstruction
and Development, Asia Report N°26, 27 November 2001
Pakistan: The Dangers of Conventional Wisdom, Pakistan
Briefing, 12 March 2002
Securing Afghanistan: The Need for More International
Action, Afghanistan Briefing, 15 March 2002
The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? Afghanistan &
Pakistan Briefing, 16 May 2002
Kashmir: Confrontation and Miscalculation, Asia Report
N°35, 11 July 2002
Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, Asia Report
N°36, 29 July 2002
The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and
Perils, Afghanistan Briefing, 30 July 2002
Pakistan: Transition to Democracy?, Asia Report N°40, 3
October 2002
Page 45
European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, Handbook
Overview, 14 April 2000
Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, Balkans Report
N°90, 19 April 2000
Bosnia’s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers,
Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000
Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the International
Community Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000
War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans Report
N°103, 2 November 2000
Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, Balkans
Report N°104, 18 December 2000
Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate the
Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°106,
15 March 2001
No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,
Balkans Report N°110, 22 May 2001
Bosnia's Precarious Economy: Still Not Open For Business;
Balkans Report N°115, 7 August 2001 (also available in
Bosnian)
The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska,
Balkans Report N°118, 8 October 2001 (also available in
Bosnian)
Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery, Balkans
Report N°121, 29 November 2001 (also available in Bosnian)
Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°127, 26 March 2002 (also
available in Bosnian)
Implementing Equality: The "Constituent Peoples" Decision
in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°128, 16 April
2002 (also available in Bosnian)
Policing the Police in Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda,
Balkans Report N°130, 10 May 2002 (also available in Bosnian)
Bosnia's Alliance for (Smallish) Change, Balkans Report
N°132, 2 August 2002 (also available in Bosnian)
CROATIA
Facing Up to War Crimes, Balkans Briefing, 16 October 2001
KOSOVO
BALKANS
ALBANIA
Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March
2000
Albania’s Local Elections, A test of Stability and Democracy,
Balkans Briefing, 25 August 2000
Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans Report No111,
25 May 2001
Albania’s Parliamentary Elections 2001, Balkans Briefing,
23 August 2001
BOSNIA
Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, Balkans
Report N°86, 23 February 2000
Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s Unfinished
Business, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000
What Happened to the KLA? Balkans Report N°88, 3 March
2000
Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica,
Balkans Report N°96, 31 May 2000
Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, Balkans Report, 27 June
2000
Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy? Balkans
Report N°97, 7 July 2000
Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000
Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica’s Victory, Balkans Briefing,
10 October 2000
Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001
Ces rapports sont disponibles sur le site internet de l’ICG, www.crisisweb.org
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Kosovo: Landmark Election, Balkans Report N°120, 21
November 2001 (also available in Albanian and Serbo-Croat)
Kosovo: A Strategy for Economic Development, Balkans Report
N°123, 19 December 2001 (also available in Serbo-Croat)
A Kosovo Roadmap: I. Addressing Final Status, Balkans
Report N°124, 28 February 2002 (also available in Albanian and
Serbo-Croat)
A Kosovo Roadmap: II. Internal Benchmarks, Balkans Report
N°125, 1 March 2002 (also available in Albanian and Serbo-
Croat)
UNMIK’s Kosovo Albatross: Tackling Division in Mitrovica,
Balkans Report N°131, 3 June 2002 (also available in Albanian
and Serbo-Croat)
Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo, Balkans
Report N°134, 12 September 2002 (also available in Albanian)
MACEDONIA
Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, Balkans
Report N°98, 2 August 2000
Macedonia Government Expects Setback in Local Elections,
Balkans Briefing, 4 September 2000
The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, Balkans
Report N°109, 5 April 2001
Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report
N°113, 20 June 2001
Macedonia: Still Sliding, Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001
Macedonia: War on Hold, Balkans Briefing, 15 August 2001
Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum, Balkans Briefing,
8 September 2001
Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to
Resolve It, Balkans Report N°122, 10 December 2001 (also
available in Serbo-Croat)
Macedonia’s Public Secret: How Corruption Drags The
Country Down, Balkans Report N°133, 14 August 2002 (also
available in Macedonian)
MONTENEGRO
Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans Report
N°89, 21 March 2000
Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition?
Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000
Montenegro’s Local Elections: Testing the National
Temperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000
Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30 November
2000
Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans Report
N°107, 28 March 2001
Montenegro: Time to Decide, a Pre-Election Briefing,
Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001
Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock, Balkans
Report N°114, 1 August 2001
Still Buying Time: Montenegro, Serbia and the European
Union, Balkans Report N°129, 7 May 2002 (also available in
Serbian)
Page 46
SERBIA
Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30 May
2000
Serbia’s Grain Trade: Milosevic’s Hidden Cash Crop, Balkans
Report N°93, 5 June 2000
Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the September
Elections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000
Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
and of Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19
September 2000
Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’s
Moment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2000
Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Balkans Briefing, 10 October 2000
Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, Balkans
Briefing, 20 December 2000
A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for Regional Stability,
Balkans Report N°112, 15 June 2001
Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution? Balkans
Report N°116, 10 August 2001
Serbia’s Transition: Reforms Under Siege, Balkans Report
N°117, 21 September 2001 (also available in Serbo-Croat)
Belgrade’s Lagging Reform: Cause for International Concern,
Balkans Report N°126, 7 March 2002 (also available in
Serbo-Croat)
Serbia: Military Intervention Threatens Democratic Reform,
Balkans Briefing, 28 March 2002 (also available in Serbo-
Croat)
Fighting To Control Yugoslavia’s Military, Balkans Briefing,
12 July 2002 (also available in Serbo-Croat)
REGIONAL REPORTS
After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans
Peace, Balkans Report N°108, 26 April 2001
Milosevic in The Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia and
the Region, Balkans Briefing, 6 July 2001
Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism,
Balkans Report N°119, 9 November 2001
LATIN AMERICA
Colombia's Elusive Quest for Peace, Latin America Report
N°1, 26 March 2002 (also available in Spanish)
The 10 March 2002 Parliamentary Elections in Colombia,
Latin America Briefing, 17 April 2002 (also available in
Spanish)
The Stakes in the Presidential Election in Colombia, Latin
America Briefing, 22 May 2002 (also available in Spanish)
Colombia: The Prospects for Peace with the ELN, Latin
America Report N°2, 4 October 2002 (also available in Spanish)
MIDDLE EAST
A Time to Lead: The International Community and the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Middle East Report N°1, 10 April
2002
Ces rapports sont disponibles sur le site internet de l’ICG, www.crisisweb.org
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Middle East Endgame I: Getting to a Comprehensive Arab-
Israeli Peace Settlement, Middle East Report N°2, 16 July
2002 (also available in Arabic)
Middle East Endgame II: How a Comprehensive Israeli-
Palestinian Settlement Would Look, Middle East Report N°3;
16 July 2002 (also available in Arabic)
Middle East Endgame III: Israel, Syria and Lebanon – How
Comprehensive Peace Settlements Would Look, Middle East
Report N°4, 16 July 2002 (also available in Arabic)
Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution ́s Soul, Middle East
Report N°5, 5 August 2002
Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath, Middle East Report
N°6, 1 October 2002
The Meanings of Palestinian Reform, Middle East Briefing,
12 November 2002
ALGERIA∗
Diminishing Returns: Algeria’s 2002 Legislative Elections,
Middle East Briefing, 24 June 2002
ISSUES REPORTS
HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, Issues Report N°1, 19 June
2001
Myanmar: The HIV/AIDS Crisis, Myanmar Briefing, 2 April
2002
EU
The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): Crisis
Response in the Grey Lane, Issues Briefing, 26 June 2001
EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for
Conflict Prevention and Management, Issues Report N°2, 26
June 2001
EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update, Issues Briefing,
29 April 2002
∗
The Algeria project was transferred from the Africa Program
in January 2002.
Ces rapports sont disponibles sur le site internet de l’ICG, www.crisisweb.org
Page 47
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Page 48
APPENDIX I
ICG BOARD MEMBERS
Martti Ahtisaari, Chairman Marika Fahlen
Former President of Finland Former Swedish Ambassador for Humanitarian Affairs; Director of
                           Social Mobilization and Strategic Information, UNAIDS
Maria Livanos Cattaui, Vice-Chairman
Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce Yoichi Funabashi
Stephen Solarz, Vice-Chairman Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun,
                             Japan
Former U.S. Congressman
Gareth Evans, President & CEO
Former Foreign Minister of Australia
S. Daniel Abraham
Bronislaw Geremek
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland
I.K.Gujral
Former Prime Minister of India
Chairman, Center for Middle East Peace and Economic HRH El Hassan bin Talal
Cooperation, U.S.
Morton Abramowitz Carla Hills
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Former U.S. Secretary of Housing; former U.S. Trade
Turkey Representative
Kenneth Adelman Asma Jahangir
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Disarmament Agency Executions; Advocate Supreme Court, former Chair Human Rights
                  Commission of Pakistan
Richard Allen
Chairman, Arab Thought Forum; President, Club of Rome
Former U.S. National Security Adviser to the President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
Saud Nasir Al-Sabah Senior Adviser, Modern Africa Fund Managers; former Liberian
                   Minister of Finance and Director of UNDP Regional Bureau for
                  Africa
Former Kuwaiti Ambassador to the UK and U.S.; former Minister
of Information and Oil
Louise Arbour
Supreme Court Justice, Canada; Former Chief Prosecutor,
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
Oscar Arias Sanchez
Former President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize, 1987
Ersin Arioglu
Chairman, Yapi Merkezi Group, Turkey
Emma Bonino
Member of European Parliament; former European Commissioner
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Former U.S. National Security Adviser to the President
Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner to the UK; former
Secretary General of the ANC
Victor Chu
Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong
Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Mikhail Khodorkovsky
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, YUKOS Oil Company,
Russia
Elliott F. Kulick
Chairman, Pegasus International, U.S.
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Novelist and journalist, U.S.
Todung Mulya Lubis
Human rights lawyer and author, Indonesia
Barbara McDougall
Former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada
Mo Mowlam
Former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, UK
Ayo Obe
President, Civil Liberties Organisation, Nigeria
Christine Ockrent
Journalist and author, France
Friedbert Pflüger
Chairman of the German Bundestag Committee on EU Affairs
Surin Pitsuwan
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
End of Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation
ICG Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002
Page 49
Itamar Rabinovich Thorvald Stoltenberg
President of Tel Aviv University; former Israeli Ambassador to the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway
U.S. and Chief Negotiator with Syria
Fidel V. Ramos Chairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe, U.S.
Former President of the Philippines
Mohamed Sahnoun
William O. Taylor
Ed van Thijn
Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Africa Former Netherlands Minister of Interior; former Mayor of
                                                                 Amsterdam
Salim A. Salim Simone Veil
Former Prime Minister of Tanzania; former Secretary General of Former President of the European Parliament; former Minister for
the Organisation of African Unity Health, France
Douglas Schoen Shirley Williams
Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S. Former Secretary of State for Education and Science; Member
                                                           House of Lords, UK
William Shawcross
Journalist and author, UK
George Soros
Chairman, Open Society Institute
Eduardo Stein
Jaushieh Joseph Wu
Deputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan
Grigory Yavlinsky
Chairman of Yabloko Party and its Duma faction, Russia
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guatemala Uta Zapf
Pär Stenbäck Chairperson of the German Bundestag Subcommittee on
              Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland